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INTRODUCTION 
Federal and state laws allow U.S. financial conglomerates to own 
securities, insurance and depository institutions through a holding 
company structure.  Before the recent crisis, the federal or state 
agency responsible for regulating a financial conglomerate as a whole 
was determined by what subsidiaries the holding company owned, 
and in particular, the type of depository institution1 was usually 
determinative as to which agency regulated the financial 
conglomerate on a consolidated basis.2  For example, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision supervised American International Group, Inc. 
(AIG), instead of the Federal Reserve, because AIG owned a thrift, 
not a bank.3  
The multiple regulators for financial conglomerates led to a 
number of problems that contributed to the recent financial crisis.  
Among the problems created were inconsistent supervisory and 
regulatory standards, particularly with regard to capital adequacy, a 
failure by regulators to undertake the risks (systemic, financial, 
operational, etc.) posed by subsidiaries in sectors outside of the 
primary responsibility of the regulator, regulatory arbitrage, and a 
                                                 
 1. Depository institutions include commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions and 
industrial banks.  See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2006).  All of these entities accept 
deposits and make loans.  See id. § 1841(c).  The differences between these entities 
are based on their ownership structures, the range of services that they provide, and 
the regulatory requirements that they must meet.  See id. § 1841. 
 2. See discussion infra Part I.A–F. 
 3. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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failure to address the problems of increasingly interconnected and 
larger financial conglomerates that posed systemic risks that made 
regulators opposed to letting them fail.4  This last problem is 
generally referred to as the “too big to fail” problem. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act5 
(the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”) attempts to correct some of these 
problems.  This Article discusses how the different financial 
conglomerate regulations contributed to the recent financial crisis 
and whether the reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act corrected these 
problems.  Part I will outline the prior regulatory structure.  Part II 
will address the problems created by this structure that contributed to 
the recent financial crisis.  Part III will describe the reforms 
contained in the Dodd-Frank Act and analyze to what extent they 
correct the problems present in the prior regulatory regime.  Finally, 
the Conclusion will point out what additional reforms might be taken 
to build on the reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
I. PRE-CRISIS REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES 
The United States has over 115 federal and state agencies 
regulating some aspect of financial services within the United States.6  
These regulators include the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) in the Treasury Department, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) in the Treasury Department, the National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
                                                 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.A–F. 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301) [hereinafter 
Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 6. The number of state agencies regulating banking, securities, and insurance 
equals 110 because some states have incorporated the regulation of banks and 
securities firms or banks and insurance companies or firms from all three sectors 
into one agency.  See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One:  Why the 
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 n.7 
(2005).  The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) replaced the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and was created by the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 289, 122 Stat. 2654 (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4501).  See also 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (section of U.S.C. amended by § 1101 
of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act). 
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Corporation (PBGC), as well as state insurance, banking, and 
securities regulatory agencies in all fifty states plus the District of 
Columbia.7 
Immediately prior to the current financial crisis, financial 
conglomerates could be regulated by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, 
the OTS, the SEC, the FHFA, and state regulators.  Which federal 
regulator supervised a financial conglomerate depended in large part 
on whether the financial conglomerate owned a depository 
institution and what type of depository institution they owned.8 
Depository institutions include commercial banks, thrifts, credit 
unions, and industrial banks.9  All of these entities accept deposits 
and make loans.10  The differences between these entities are based 
on their ownership structures, the range of services that they provide, 
and the regulatory requirements that they must meet.  In addition, 
the type of entity that may own certain depository entities is restricted 
by law.  The federal Bank Holding Company Act of 195611 (BHCA) 
mandates that the holding companies for “banks,” as defined within 
the BHCA, must only be involved in activities that are related to 
banking or financial services.12  With certain exceptions, the BHCA 
defines a “bank” as an insured bank as defined under section 3(h) of 
the Federal Deposition Insurance Act13 or an institution which 
accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans.14  Among the 
entities exempted from the definition of a “bank” under the BHCA 
are thrifts, credit unions, industrial loan companies, limited purpose 
banks that engage solely in trust or fiduciary activities, entities that 
engage solely in credit card operations, and foreign bank 
subsidiaries.15  As a result, the holding company for an industrial bank 
is not limited to engaging only in activities related to banking or 
financial services because an industrial bank is not considered a 
                                                 
 7. See Brown, supra note 6, at 5–6 (describing the “balkanized regulatory 
structure” of the U.S. financial services); see also 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (creating the 
FHFA). 
 8. See infra notes 9–15, 32–38, 60, 65–69, 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 10. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).   
 11. Id. §§ 1841–49.   
 12. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y),  
12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2010). 
 13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35.   
 14. Id. § 1841(c).  Section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines an 
“insured bank” as “any bank (including a foreign bank having an insured branch) 
the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; 
and the term ‘noninsured bank’ means any bank the deposits of which are not so 
insured.”  Id. § 1813(h).  
 15. Id. § 1841(a)(5).  
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“bank” under the BHCA.  The state laws governing industrial bank 
holding companies also do not put any such limitations on them.16  As 
a result, commercial and retail businesses, like Target, can own 
industrial banks.17 
Before discussing in more depth how the federal and state holding 
company regulators operated, it is worth noting that some financial 
conglomerates were not regulated by either a federal or state holding 
company regulator.  If a conglomerate did not own a bank, a thrift, 
or an industrial loan company, but owned other financial companies, 
such as commercial finance companies or investment companies, 
federal and state holding company regulators might lack any 
authority to regulate the conglomerate as a whole.18  The individual 
subsidiaries within such a conglomerate would be regulated by their 
respective functional or institutional regulators,19 to the extent that 
they existed, but no regulator would have been examining how those 
                                                 
 16. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 carved out an exemption from 
the definition of “bank” in the Bank Holding Company Act for industrial loan 
companies and industrial banks.  See id. § 1841(c)(2)(H); Bank Holding Companies 
and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2010).  For an 
example of state laws governing industrial bank holding companies, see CAL. FIN. 
CODE §§ 18438–54 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-16 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 17. Target owns Target Bank, a Utah state chartered industrial bank.  See Business 
Credit Card Services Help, TARGET, http://www.target.com/Business-Card-Credit-
Services-Help/b?ie=UTF8&node=14052341 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  Nevertheless, 
prior to the crisis in 2007, the ten largest industrial banks by assets were owned by 
firms involved in financial services.  See INS. INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT 
BOOK 2009, at 68 (2009).  The top ten industrial banks by assets and their parents (as 
noted by parentheses) as of March 31, 2008 were as follows:  1. Merrill Lynch Bank 
USA (Merrill Lynch), 2. Morgan Stanley Bank (Morgan Stanley), 3. GMAC Bank 
(Cerberus/GMAC), 4. UBS Bank USA (UBS), 5. Goldman Sachs Bank (Goldman 
Sachs), 6. American Express Centurion Bank (American Express), 7. Capmark Bank 
(Capmark Financial Group/GMAC), 8. Lehman Brothers Commercial Bank 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), 9. Fremont Investment & Loan (Fremont 
General Corporation/Diamond A. Ford), and 10. USAA Savings Bank (USAA Life 
Company).  Id.  The top eight of these ten industrial banks were chartered in Utah.  
See id. 
 18. See discussion infra Part I.A–F (concerning the regulation of holding 
companies for banks, thrifts, and industrial loan companies).  Entities falling outside 
of those regulations are not regulated on a consolidated basis as a holding company. 
 19. Under functional regulation, a regulator focuses on regulating a particular 
category of financial products or services being provided, rather than the institution 
providing those products or services.  PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL 
§ 12.02[2] (2d ed. 2003).  Under functional regulation, the SEC would regulate the 
securities regardless of whether they were offered to investors by banks or securities 
firms.  See id.  Historically, under institutional regulation, federal and state bank 
regulators regulated securities offered by banks.  Id.  Historically, federal and state 
legislators created regulators to regulate particular financial institutions.  Id.  This 
type of regulation is called institutional or entity regulation.  Id.  The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act was designed to move the U.S. regulatory system away from institutional 
regulation towards functional regulation.  See id.  The U.S. regulatory system prior to 
the financial crisis, however, was not a pure functional regulatory scheme but rather 
a mixture of institutional and functional regulation.  See Brown, supra note 6, at 19. 
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subsidiaries interacted with the other subsidiaries owned by the 
conglomerate or the interconnectedness of all of a particular 
conglomerate’s operations with the rest of the financial system.  
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is an example of a large financial 
conglomerate (over 80% of its total revenues in 2009 came from 
financial services) that has no federal holding company regulator.20  
Its insurance subsidiaries, however, are regulated by state insurance 
commissions for the states in which they operate.21   
If all financial conglomerates that lacked a holding company 
regulator operated like Berkshire Hathaway, perhaps such regulators 
would not be needed.  Enron Corp., however, illustrates why the 
absence of a financial services holding company regulator might 
matter.  No federal or state financial services holding company 
regulator oversaw Enron’s business despite the fact that it was a 
financial conglomerate.22  One of Enron’s core businesses was 
derivatives trading.23  According to its 2000 financial statements, 
about 7% of Enron’s total revenues and one-third of its assets came 
from its derivative business.24  In addition, in its 2000 annual report to 
the SEC, Enron reported that it owned a controlling interest in 
dozens of finance and investment companies in the United States and 
across the globe.25  Its consolidated financial statements included the 
revenues, assets and liabilities of these subsidiaries.  Enron, however, 
had more than 3000 off-balance sheet subsidiaries and partnerships, 
many of whom engaged in derivatives deals with Enron.26  According 
to one study, Enron’s derivatives book had a notional value of $758 
                                                 
 20. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
 21. See id. at 1–3. 
 22. See Enron Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), Ex. 21 (April 2, 2001) 
[hereinafter Enron 2000 10-K Report] (listing Enron’s subsidiaries).  Enron did not 
own a bank, a thrift, or an industrial loan company.  As a result, it did not have a 
federal or state financial services holding company regulator.  See discussion infra 
Part I.A–F (highlighting pre-crisis regulating structures).  In addition, Enron’s 
annual report discussed being regulated as a public utility holding company and 
other types of federal regulation, but did not discuss being regulated as a financial 
services holding company.  See Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra, at 15–21. 
 23. See Enron and the Use of Derivatives:  Testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Partnoy Hearing] (statement 
of Prof. Frank Partnoy) (highlighting Enron’s trading derivatives in the year 2000, 
which made more money alone than Long-Term Capital Management made in its 
entire history), available at http://reg-markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-
safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/testimony_02_03.pdf; ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS:  
GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 6 (2002). 
 24. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 241; Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra note 22, at F-3,  
F-4. 
 25. Enron 2000 10-K Report, supra note 22, at Ex. 21. 
 26. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 3. 
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billion at the end of 2000.27  To put this in perspective, Enron’s book 
represented slightly less than 1% of the approximately $109.2 trillion 
derivatives market at the end of 2000, but this book was about three-
fourths of the notional value of the derivatives positions of Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, when the Federal 
Reserve arranged for fourteen banks to bail out LTCM in 1998.28  
Not only did Enron escape regulation on a consolidated basis as a 
holding company for various financial services, but many of its 
subsidiaries were not subjected to either functional or institutional 
regulation.  Neither the SEC, the CFTC, nor any other federal or 
state agency regulated the over-the-counter derivatives trading 
conducted by Enron and its subsidiaries.29  The Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act of 200030 exempted such derivatives from 
regulation.31  Consequently, functional or institutional regulation 
sometimes failed to provide adequate protection for the financial 
system from financial conglomerates that lacked a holding company 
regulator. 
A. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
The OCC regulates national banks that owned subsidiaries that sell 
insurance or securities.32  These financial subsidiaries can only engage 
in financial activities that the bank could engage in directly.  Thus, 
these subsidiaries cannot engage in annuities or insurance 
                                                 
 27. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 242 (citing a study by Randall Dodd and Jason Hoody 
of the Derivatives Study Center). 
 28. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2 (providing a figure for the derivatives 
market that includes both the $14 trillion in exchange traded derivatives and the 
$95.2 trillion in over-the-counter derivatives); see also BRYCE, supra note 23, at 324–25 
(describing the LTCM’s $1 trillion derivatives position and its bailout); KEVIN DOWD, 
CATO INST., TOO BIG TO FAIL?  LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE 1–5 (1999) (describing LTCM’s bailout). 
 29. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
 30. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 31. See Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 3. 
 32. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 23, 26, 27, 93a (2006) (outlining the OCC’s authority to 
charter and regulate national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2), (g)(5)–(6) (discussing 
types of subsidiaries that a national bank may operate).  “Well-capitalized” for these 
purposes is defined as having the same meaning as in section 38 of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act. Id. § 1831o(b)(1)(A).  For a bank that has been examined, 
“well-managed” means that the bank has received a composite rating of one or two 
under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System and at least a rating of two 
for management.  Id. § 24a(g)(6).  For banks that have not been examined, “well-
managed” means that the bank’s managerial resources are deemed satisfactory by the 
appropriate Federal banking agency.  Id.  The OCC will send a notice to any national 
bank failing to meet these requirements that orders it to correct the deficiencies.  Id. 
§ 24a(e)(1).  If the bank fails to correct these deficiencies within 180 days after 
receiving the notice, then the OCC may order the bank to divest control of any 
financial subsidiary.  Id. § 24a(e)(4). 
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underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate 
investment or development, or merchant banking.33  In addition, the 
national bank cannot allow the aggregate consolidated total assets of 
all of its financial subsidiaries to exceed the lesser of $50 billion or 
45% of the national bank’s consolidated total assets.34 
B. Federal Reserve 
The Federal Reserve regulates two types of financial 
conglomerates—bank holding companies (“BHC”) and financial 
holding companies (“FHC”).35  The BHCA mandates that the holding 
companies for “banks,” as defined within the Act, must only be 
involved in activities that are related to banking or financial services.36  
With certain exceptions, the BHCA defines a “bank” as an insured 
bank as defined under section 3(h) of the Federal Deposition 
Insurance Act37 or an institution which accepts demand deposits and 
makes commercial loans.38  The BHCA allows BHCs to own 
subsidiaries that engage in nonbank activities only if those activities 
are closely related to banking activities.39  These nonbank activities 
include, among others, to act as insurance agents or brokers 
primarily in connection with credit extensions, to underwrite credit 
life, accident, and health insurance, to act as a futures commission 
merchant, and to act as a discount brokerage.40   
In 2008 as the crisis was breaking, large BHCs41 only comprised a 
little over 9% of the total number of BHCs, but they held 93.3% of 
the total assets held by all BHCs.42  In 2009, the large BHCs continued 
to grow even as the number of small BHCs declined.  The number of 
                                                 
 33. Id. § 24a(a)(2)(B). 
 34. Id. § 24a(a)(2)(D). 
 35. Id. § 1841(a)(1), (p). 
 36. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y),  
12 C.F.R. § 225.21(a) (2010). 
 37. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–35.   
 38. Id. § 1841(c).  Section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines an 
“insured bank” as “any bank (including a foreign bank having an insured branch) 
the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter”; 
and the term “noninsured bank” as “any bank the deposits of which are not so 
insured.”  Id. § 1813(h).  
 39. Id. §§ 1841(c)(2), 1843(c)(8), (13); ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, 
REREGULATION:  THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 
66–67 (1994). 
 40. GART, supra note 39, at 66. 
 41. The Federal Reserve defines large BHCs as those with more than $1 billion in 
total assets.  U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 95TH ANNUAL REPORT 
98 (2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2008], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/annual08/pdf/AR08.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
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that had not been registered as BHCs prior to the GLBA represented 
only 22% of the registered FHCs.56  These financial conglomerates 
included Charles Schwab & Co., MetLife and Franklin Resources.57   
The GLBA did not require financial conglomerates to register as 
BHCs or FHCs if they did not own banks subject to the Bank Holding 
Company Act.  As a result, many of the largest financial 
conglomerates chose not to register as FHCs, including American 
Express, AIG, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch.58  In 
many cases, these firms did own other types of depository institutions.  
For example, AIG owned AIG Federal Savings Bank, a thrift, 
Goldman Sachs owned Goldman Sachs Bank USA, an industrial loan 
company, and Morgan Stanley owned Morgan Bank, an industrial 
loan company, Morgan Stanley Trust, a federal savings association, 
Morgan Stanley Trust National Association, a limited purpose 
national bank, and certain foreign bank subsidiaries.59   
C. Office of Thrift Supervision 
Financial conglomerates that own thrifts, like AIG, are classified as 
thrift holding companies (“THCs”) and are regulated by the OTS.60  
At the end of 2007, the OTS was supervising 475 thrift holding 
companies.61  Those thrift holding companies own about 35% of all 
of the thrifts in the United States and more than half of the thrifts 
regulated by the OTS in 2007.62  Those thrift holding companies held 
                                                 
 56. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT 2–3 (2003) (noting that FHCs “represent 78 percent of the total 
assets of all bank holding companies” in 2003). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Brown, supra note 6, at 13 n.42.  
 59. See About AIG Bank, AIGBANK, 
https://www.aigbank.com/aigbank/aboutaig.jsp (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Press 
Release, U.S. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving the 
Formation of Bank Holding Companies—Goldman Sachs, Inc. (Sept. 22, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a1.pdf; 
Press Release, U.S. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving the 
Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain 
Nonbanking Activities—Morgan Stanley (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20080922a2.pdf.   
 60. See Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1467a (2006) (setting forth 
specific regulations concerning financial conglomerates); OFFICE OF THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2008 FACT BOOK 77 n.17 (2009) 
[hereinafter OTS FACT BOOK].  
 61. OTS FACT BOOK, supra note 60, at 71.  Some savings associations are owned by 
more than one holding company, which is why there are more holding companies 
than savings associations that own them. 
 62. Id. at 5–6, 71. THCs owned 435 thrifts out of the 1252 thrifts in the United 
States, of which the OTS regulated only 827 in 2007.  Id.   
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
1352 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1339 
US $8.4 trillion in assets, of which only about 15% were thrift assets 
and the remainder came from other enterprises.63  The OTS 
supervised some very large conglomerates as THCs, including AIG, 
Countrywide Financial, General Electric Company, General Motors 
Corporation, IndyMac Bancorp Inc., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
and Washington Mutual.64   
D. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Section 231 of the GLBA amended section 78q of the Securities 
Exchange Act to give the SEC authority to act as a holding company 
regulator for financial conglomerates that were not regulated as bank 
or thrift holding companies by the Federal Reserve or the OTS.65  
Under section section 78q(i), however, the SEC could only regulate 
those holding companies that voluntarily elected to be subject to its 
regulation.66  The SEC did not set up any procedures for regulating 
financial conglomerates under this provision until 2004.67  Under the 
regime created by the SEC, a financial conglomerate could elect to 
be supervised by the SEC as either consolidated supervised entity 
(“CSE”) or as supervised investment bank holding company 
(“SIBHC”).68  The SEC’s Division of Market Regulation acted as the 
prudential supervisor for both CSEs and SIBHCs.69   
Seven firms voluntarily became CSEs—the Bear Stearns 
Companies, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch Bank & 
Trust Co., and Morgan Stanley.70  The SEC was the sole consolidated 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 71. 
 64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION:  AGENCIES 
ENGAGED IN CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION CAN STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT AND COLLABORATION 12 (2007) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL MARKET 
REGULATION REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07154.pdf; 
Countrywide Financial Corporation, Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 17 (Feb. 28, 
2007); IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 10 (Mar. 1, 2007); 
Washington Mutual Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 1, 2007). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) (2006). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of 
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) [hereinafter CSE Final Rule]; Supervised Investment Bank 
Holding Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (Aug. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 200) [hereinafter SIBHC Final Rule]. 
 68. See CSE Final Rule, supra note 67, at 34,428; SIBHC Final Rule, supra note 67, 
at 34,474–76 (setting forth Rule 17i-2).  
 69. See Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2010). 
 70. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF 
AUDITS, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES:  THE CONSOLIDATED 
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM iv (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter SEC IG’S CSE REPORT], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf. 
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supervisor for only four of these firms.  The Federal Reserve 
supervised Citigroup Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co., which were 
registered FHCs, and the OTS supervised parts of Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, as THCs.71 
The SEC finally created the CSE and SIBHC regime in 2004  
because it had been subject to intense lobbying from U.S. financial 
conglomerates that did not have a primary federal regulator and were 
concerned about being subject to regulation by European financial 
supervisors under the European Union’s Financial Conglomerates 
Directive (“EU FCD”).72  The EU FCD was adopted in 2002 and 
required supervisors and financial groups to measure on a 
consolidated basis the prudential soundness of groups with 
significant business in the banking, securities and insurance sectors 
and that are operating within the European Union.73  The EU FCD 
also required non-EU financial conglomerates operating within the 
European Union to have their home country supervisors provide a 
form of consolidated supervision that is equivalent to that provided 
by the EU FCD or be supervised on a consolidated basis by a financial 
supervisor within one of the EU member nations.74  The directive 
required member states to adopt the laws necessary to implement the 
directive by August 11, 2004.75 
E. State Holding Company Regulators 
In addition to these federal regulators for holding companies, the 
state banking and financial institution regulators also regulate 
holding companies.  As a result, holding companies can be subject to 
duplicative state and federal regulation.   
For example, Capital One Financial Corporation owns Capital One 
Bank, which was a Virginia state chartered bank until March 2008 
when it converted to a national bank charter.76  As a result, Capital 
One Financial Corporation is a BHC regulated by the Federal 
Reserve.77  In 2005, Capital One Financial Corporation elected to 
become a FHC regulated by the Federal Reserve so that it could offer 
a wider range of financial products.78  Because Capital One Bank was 
                                                 
 71. Id. at v. 
 72. Council Directive 2002/87, 2002 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Financial 
Conglomerates Directive]; SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4. 
 73. See Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 72, at arts. 5–9. 
 74. Id. art. 18, at 12. 
 75. Id. art. 34, at 23. 
 76. Capital One Fin. Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 45 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Id. at 8–9. 
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originally a Virginia state chartered bank, Capital One Financial 
Corporation is registered as a financial institution holding company 
under Virginia law and subject to regulation by the Virginia Bureau 
of Financial Institutions.79  
Holding companies that own industrial loan companies or 
industrial banks, but do not own a bank subject to the Bank Holding 
Company Act, a thrift, or a broker-dealer firm do not have a federal 
supervisor.80  The state agencies that chartered an industrial bank or 
an industrial loan company also supervise the industrial bank holding 
company or industrial loan holding company that owns them.81  
Unlike BHCs, holding companies of industrial banks may be 
commercial enterprises and may own subsidiaries that are 
commercial businesses.  Industrial bank holding companies are not 
restricted to only engaging in financial activities. 
F. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight  
The government sponsored entities (“GSEs”) comprise a special 
category of financial conglomerate because they were originally 
chartered by the federal government to help increase stability and 
liquidity in the U.S. housing markets.82  The Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal National 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 9, 12; see VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-702 (2010). 
 80. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2006); Home Owners’ 
Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1467(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1g (2010).  
 81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-56 (LexisNexis 2010); CAL. FIN. CODE § 18390 (West 
1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-101-401 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-16 (LexisNexis 
2006). 
 82. For purposes of this Article, GSEs only refers to the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, also known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, also known as Freddie Mac.  Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual 
Report, (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Fannie Mae 2007 10-K 
Report]; Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 1, 3 (Feb. 
24, 2010) [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2011 10-K Report].  Other entities that are also 
classified as GSEs, but which will not be discussed in this Article include the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, the Farm Credit System, and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation, also known as Farmer Mac.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-
269T, GOV’T SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:  A FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING GSE 
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT 1 (2004).  Some commentators classify the Government 
National Mortgage Association, also known as Ginnie Mae, as a GSE, but it is not a 
privately owned entity that is “sponsored” by the federal government like Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the other GSEs but is, in fact, an entity that is wholly-owned 
by the federal government.  GOV’T NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 7 
(2010), available at 
 http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/ann_rep/annual_report10.pdf.   
SLM Corporation, also known as Sallie Mae, started out as a GSE in 1972 when its 
name was the Student Loan Marketing Association.  SLM Corp., Annual Report, 
(Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2011).  It was completely privatized and ceased to be 
classified as a GSE in 1997.  Id. 
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Mortgage Association, (Fannie Mae), are the two largest of these 
entities.  In 2007, the GSEs were ranked as two of the twenty largest 
U.S. financial conglomerates based on revenues by Fortune 
magazine.83 
Prior to July 30, 2008, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) in the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) supervised Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.84  On 
July 30, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Authority was created 
when President George W. Bush signed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008.85  Prior to the financial crisis, OFHEO was the 
prudential regulator for the GSEs and conducted periodic 
examinations to ensure their safety and soundness.86  
The SEC, HUD and the Treasury Department also regulated 
certain aspects of Freddie Mac’s and Fannie Mae’s business.  Fannie 
Mae voluntarily registered its common stock with the SEC in March 
2003 and Freddie Mac voluntarily registered its common stock with 
the SEC in July 2008.87  Since those registrations, the GSEs have been 
subject to the periodic reporting requirements under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.88  The securities issued by the GSEs are 
classified as “exempted securities” and are exempt from the 
registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933.89  HUD 
must approve any new programs offered by Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae and it conducts investigations to verify that they are complying 
with the requirements of their charters and other regulations.90  The 
GSEs can only issue certain types of debt securities with the approval 
of the Treasury Department.91 
                                                 
 83. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 17, at 9. 
 84. OFHEO, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS 53 n.2 (2008), available at  
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf;  
FHFA, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS 101 (2009), available at  
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2335/FHFA_ReportToCongress2008508rev.pdf. 
 85. FHFA, supra note 84, at 101.  
 86. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 16–19; Freddie Mac 2011 10-
K Report, supra note 82, at 29. 
 87. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; SEC Filings, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/sec_filings/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2011). 
 88. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; Freddie Mac 2011 10-K 
Report, supra note 82, at 16. 
 89. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; see also Freddie Mac 2011 
10-K Report, supra note 82, at 16. 
 90. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14–16; Freddie Mac 2011 10-
K Report, supra note 82, at 6, 30. 
 91. Fannie Mae 2007 10-K Report, supra note 82, at 14; Freddie Mac 2011 10-K 
Report, supra note 82, at 9, 30. 
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G. Supervision of Holding Company Subsidiaries 
Holding company regulators, like the Federal Reserve, generally 
were required to use the reports generated by the regulators for the 
subsidiaries.92  For example, under GLBA, the Federal Reserve could 
only examine a “functionally regulated subsidiary” of a FHC or a BHC 
if: 
(i) the Board has reasonable cause to believe that such subsidiary is 
engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated 
depository institution; 
(ii) the Board reasonably determines, after reviewing relevant 
reports, that examination of the subsidiary is necessary to 
adequately inform the Board of the systems described in 
subparagraph (A)(ii)(II) [systems for monitoring and controlling 
financial and operational risks that may threaten the safety and 
soundness of any depository institution subsidiary of the holding 
company]; or 
(iii) based on reports and other available information, the Board 
has reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in 
compliance with this chapter or any other Federal law that the 
Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against such subsidiary, 
including provisions relating to transactions with an affiliated 
depository institution, and the Board cannot make such 
determination through examination of the affiliated depository 
institution or the bank holding company.93 
Even if the Federal Reserve did conduct an examination of one or 
more of the subsidiaries of a FHC or a BHC, it had limited authority 
to impose new regulations on the subsidiaries.  Under GLBA, the 
Federal Reserve was prohibited from imposing any capital 
requirements on any functionally regulated subsidiary of a FHC or 
BHC.94  In addition, the Federal Reserve could not prescribe other 
types of regulations for functionally regulated subsidiaries of a FHC 
or BHC unless: 
(1) the action is necessary to prevent or redress an unsafe or 
unsound practice or breach of fiduciary duty by such subsidiary 
that poses a material risk to—  
                                                 
 92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1476a(b)(4) (2006) (“The Director [of OTS] shall, to the 
extent deemed feasible, use for the purposes of this subsection reports filed with or 
examinations made by other Federal agencies or the appropriate State supervisory 
authority.”); id. § 1844(c)(2)(E) (requiring the Federal Reserve to use reports on 
registered brokers, dealers, and investment advisers prepared by the SEC and state 
regulators, insurance companies prepared by state insurance regulators, and on any 
other subsidiary supervised by a federal or state authority). 
 93. Id. § 1844(c)(2)(B). 
 94. Id. § 1844(c)(3). 
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 (A) the financial safety, soundness, or stability of an affiliated 
depository institution; or 
 (B) the domestic or international payment system; and 
(2) the Board finds that it is not reasonably possible to protect 
effectively against the material risk at issue through action directed 
at or against the affiliated depository institution or against 
depository institutions generally.95 
As a result, the Federal Reserve and other holding company 
regulators generally deferred to the functional regulator of a 
particular subsidiary rather than conduct their own independent 
examination.  This meant that they had to rely on dozens of state and 
federal regulators for information about the subsidiaries of a single 
financial conglomerate.  Not surprisingly, the types of reports 
produced by these agencies vary greatly just as the entities that they 
supervise vary greatly in terms of their size and product offerings. 
II. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE PRE-CRISIS REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 
The pre-crisis regulatory structure contained a number of 
problems associated with financial conglomerates that ultimately 
contributed to the financial crisis, particularly the high leverage of 
many financial conglomerates.  The most serious of these problems 
were:  (1) the lack of uniform standards for financial conglomerates, 
particularly in the area of capital requirements, (2) the lack of 
coordination amongst regulators to ensure risks (systemic, financial, 
operational, etc.) associated with financial conglomerates were 
handled consistently and to share information and expertise, (3) the 
failure of regulators to understand the risks posed by the functional 
businesses in which the financial conglomerates engaged, (4) the 
ability of some financial conglomerates to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage through their ability to pick their regulator, and (5) the 
failure of regulators to address the growth and concentration of 
financial conglomerates within the financial services industry, which 
allowed some firms to become too-big-to-fail, and created the moral 
hazard problem that led to the bailouts.  Each of these factors will be 
examined in more detail. 
                                                 
 95. Id. § 1848a(a). 
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A. Lack of Uniform Supervisory and Regulatory Standards  
The lack of uniform supervisory and regulatory standards arose 
across a range of issues.  The most serious problem, however, was the 
different standards for capital adequacy.   
All of the holding company regulators in the United States focused 
on the capital adequacy of the holding companies on a consolidated 
basis as well as the credit risks, market risks, and operational risks that 
they posed.  All of them were influenced in their approach to these 
risks by the release by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(“Basel Committee”) in June 2004 of new capital adequacy standards 
under the title, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards:  A Revised Framework, which came to be known as 
Basel II.96   
Basel II is based on three pillars that must be met for a bank to be 
adequately capitalized.  Pillar I sets forth the minimum capital 
required based on the bank’s total risk weighted assets, which would 
be calculated using a formula that took into account credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk.97  Pillar II defines the supervisory 
activities of each national authority and allows them to mandate that 
banks hold additional capital to cover risks not appropriately 
accounted for under Pillar one.98  Pillar III outlines the reporting and 
public disclosure requirements for banks in an effort to use 
disclosure and market discipline to encourage appropriate risk 
management by banks.99 
Basel II gave banks a choice of making their capital adequacy 
calculations in one of three ways.  They could use a simplified 
approach that employed fixed weights set by the Basel Committee.100  
Alternatively, they could use a standardized approach that relied on 
external ratings provided by credit agencies to adjust the weights of 
the assets.101  Finally, they could use an internal ratings-based (“IRB”) 
approach based upon their own internal risk models.102   
The difference between the capital required under Basel I and 
Basel II was striking.  For example, Basel II would allow banks using 
                                                 
 96. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS:  A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1. 
 97. Id. at 12. 
 98. Id. at 158. 
 99. Id. at 175. 
 100. Id. at 12–14. 
 101. Id. at 15. 
 102. Id. at 48. 
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the simplified approach to cut the risk weight of mortgages from 50% 
under Basel I to 35% under the simplified approach of Basel II.103 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve and the other banking 
regulators agreed that only a handful of large, internationally active 
banks would be required to use the IRB approach and that another 
group of large banks would be allowed to voluntarily adopt the IRB 
approach.104  All other banks in the United States would continue to 
use the capital adequacy standards imposed by the Basel I Capital 
Accord.105  The SEC also allowed the CSEs that it regulated to use 
internal risk models when calculating their capital requirements and 
gave them far more flexibility than the Federal Reserve gave to the 
FHCs and BHCs that it regulated.106 
The average leverage ratio for U.S. commercial banks in 2008 was 
12 to 1.107  The firms regulated by the SEC as CSEs were allowed to be 
substantially more leveraged than the firms regulated by the Federal 
Reserve as FHCs or BHCs.  The average leverage ratio for Bear 
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley was 25.3 to 1, or more than double the average 
leverage ratio for U.S. commercial banks.108   
OHFEO, which regulated the GSEs, also allowed them to be 
considerably more leveraged than commercial banks were allowed to 
                                                 
 103. Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-Prime Crisis:  Causal 
Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 AND 
2008 55, 72 (Paul Bloxham & Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/6/42031344.pdf. 
 104. See Risk Based Capital Standards:  Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—
Basel II; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,290, 69,297 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, pt. 208 and 225, pt. 325, pt. 559, 560, 563, 567) (discussing 
the circumstances under which IRB adoption would be mandatory or permissive).  
 105. Id. at 69,297. 
 106. CSE Final Rule, supra note 67, at 34,428, 34,461; SIBHC Final Rule, supra 
note 67, at 34,480–85; SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 19–20. 
 107. See Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2009, at 
44, 45, 48. 
 108. THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2006), available 
at http://www.slideshare.net/QuarterlyEarningsReports3/bear-stearns-annual-
report-2006; GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT i (2008), available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annual-
reports/2008-annual-report.html; LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 59 (2007), available at http://fclass.vaniercollege.qc.ca/~laroccag/FOV1-
00043009/FOV1-
00051364/Lehman%20Brothers%20yr%202007%20Annual%20Report.pdf?FCItemI
D=S002288FE&Plugin=Loft; MERRILL LYNCH, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 56 (2007), 
available at  http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2007/ar/download.asp; 
Morgan Stanley, Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 80 (2006), available at 
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/shareholder/10k2006/10k11302006.pdf. 
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be.  In 2006, the leverage ratios for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were 20.3 to 1 and 28.7 to 1.109   
Below is a sample of some of the major financial conglomerates in 
the United States and their leverage ratios between 2000 and 2008. 
  
                                                 
 109. FANNIE MAE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2006), available at 
 http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/annualreport/2006/2006_annual_report.pdf; 
FREDDIE MAC, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2006), available at  
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/pdf/2006annualrpt.pdf. 
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Table 1:  Leverage Ratios of a Sample of Large Financial Conglomerates110 
Financial 
Institution 
(Country) 
Leverage Ratio 
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit)) 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
American 
International 
Group (US)111 
16.3 10.9 9.6 9.9 9.9 9.6 9.5 9.5 7.7 
Bank of 
America Corp. 
(US)112 
10.3 11.7 10.8 12.7 12.4 15.2 13.7 13.2 14.2 
Bear Stearns 
(US)113 
— 32.8 26.5 26.0 27.7 26.4 26.6 29.0 27.8 
Citigroup 
(US)114 
13.7 19.3 15.7 13.3 13.6 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.6 
Countrywide 
Financial 
(US)115 
— 14.4 14.0 13.7 12.5 12.1 11.2 9.1 5.5 
Fannie Mae 
(US)116 
— 19.0 20.3 21.2 26.2 31.7 28.4 44.1 32.4 
                                                 
 110. Any numbers in parentheses are negative.  
 111. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 192–93 (Mar. 2, 2009); 
Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 102–03 (Mar. 1, 2007); Am. 
Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 102–103 (May 27, 2005); Am. Int’l 
Group, Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 60–61 (Mar. 31, 2003); Am. Int’l Group, 
Inc., Annual Report, (Form 10-K), at 43–44 (Apr. 2, 2001). 
 112. BANK OF AM. CORP., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2008), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual; BANK OF 
AM. CORP., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2006), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual; BANK OF AM. CORP., 2004 
ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2004), available at http://phx.corporate- 
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual. 
 113. The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Jan. 
29, 2008); THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, 
at 46; The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb. 
14, 2005); The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 
(Feb. 28, 2003); The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
49 (Feb. 28, 2001).  Bear Stearns was acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 2007.  
As result, there is no annual data for its leverage ratio in 2008. 
 114. CITIGROUP INC., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2008), available at 
 http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ar.htm;  
Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.01, at 3 (Sept. 9, 2005). 
 115. Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 48 (Feb. 28, 2008); 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Mar. 19, 2003); 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-45 (Mar. 20, 2002).  
Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America in 2008 and as a result, there is no 
annual data for its leverage ratio in 2008.  See BANK OF AM. CORP., 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 112, at 5. 
 116. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-3 (Feb. 26, 2000) 
[hereinafter Fannie Mae 10-K 2008 Report]; FANNIE MAE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
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Financial 
Institution 
(Country) 
Leverage Ratio 
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit)) 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Freddie Mac 
(US)117 
— 29.7 28.7 29.7 25.3 25.5 24.0 32.7 26.7 
GMAC (US)118 8.6 16.0 20.3 15.0 14.5 14.2 12.8 12.0 12.0 
Goldman Sachs 
Group (US)119 
13.7 26.2 23.4 25.2 21.2 18.7 18.7 17.1 17.5 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co. 
(US)120 
13.0 12.7 11.7 11.2 11.0 16.7 17.9 16.9 16.9 
                                                 
note 109, at 1; Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 89, F-3 (2004); 
FANNIE MAE, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2001), available at  
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/ir/annualreport/2001/fullreport.pdf;jsessi
onid=WDJ1IWA5ZG4OPJ2FECISFGA.  Fannie Mae had no shareholders’ equity in 
2008 but, in fact, had a shareholders’ deficit.  Fannie Mae 10-K 2008 Report, supra, at 
F-3.  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie 
Mac’s combined leverage ratio, including all of the loans that they owned and had 
guaranteed, equaled 75 to 1.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT xx (2011), available at http://fcic- 
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf 
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
 117. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 58 (Mar. 11, 
2009), [hereinafter Freddie Mac 2008 10-K Report]; FREDDIE MAC, 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 109, at 22; FREDDIE MAC, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2004).  
Freddie Mac had no shareholders’ equity in 2008 but, in fact, had a shareholders’ 
deficit.  Freddie Mac 2008 10-K Report, supra at 58.  As noted in above, the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission found that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s combined 
leverage ratio, including all of the loans that they owned and guaranteed, equaled 
75:1.  FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xx. 
 118. GMAC, LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 27, 2009); GMAC, 
LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 16, 2005). 
 119. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at i; GOLDMAN SACHS, 
2005 ANNUAL REPORT i (2005), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-
firm/investors/financials/archived/annual-reports/2005-annual-report.html; 
GOLDMAN SACHS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2002), available at  
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annual-
reports/attachments/2002-annual-report.pdf; GOLDMAN SACHS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 
37 (2000), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our- 
firm/investors/financials/archived/annual-reports/2000-annual-report.html. 
 120. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2008), available at 
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual.cfm; J.P. MORGAN CHASE & 
CO., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 83 (2003), available at  
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual.cfm; J.P. MORGAN CHASE & 
CO., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://www.ba.hokkai-s-
u.ac.jp/~aono/30jpannual2000.pdf.  
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Financial 
Institution 
(Country) 
Leverage Ratio 
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit)) 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
(US)121 
24.3 30.7 26.2 24.4 23.9 23.7 29.1 29.3 28.9 
Merrill Lynch 
(US)122 
33.4 27.8 19.9 17.9 18.5 16.3 17.6 18.5 19.4 
Morgan Stanley 
(US)123 
11.4 32.6 30.4 30.5 26.8 23.0 24.5 23.6 22.1 
Wachovia 
Corp. (US)124 
— 10.2 10.1 10.9 12.1 11.2 10.7 11.6 16.6 
Washington 
Mutual (US)125 
— 13.3 12.8 12.6 14.7 14.2 13.3 17.2 19.2 
                                                 
 121. LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 29; 
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 14, 2005).  
The leverage ratio for 2008 is for the quarter ending May 31, 2008.  Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 55 (July 10, 2008). 
 122. Merrill Lynch & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 53–54 (Feb. 24, 2009) 
(leverage ratio for 2008 calculated by dividing total assets by total shareholders’ 
equity); MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 56; MERRILL 
LYNCH & CO., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2005), available at  
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2005/ar/download.asp; MERRILL 
LYNCH & CO., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2003), available at  
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/2003/ar/pdf.asp; MERRILL LYNCH & 
CO., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2001), available at  
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/annrep2001/ar-pdf/ml-annual.pdf. 
 123. Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 75 (Jan. 28, 2009); MORGAN 
STANLEY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 108, at 80; Morgan Stanley, Annual Report 
(Form 10-K), at 68 (Feb. 10, 2005); Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
51 (Feb. 19, 2003); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 
at 22 (Feb. 16, 2001) (leverage ratio for 2000 calculated by dividing total assets by 
total shareholders’ equity). 
 124. WACHOVIA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, at 1 (2007), available at 
 https://www.wachovia.com/file/2007_Wachovia_Annual_Report.pdf; WACHOVIA, 
2004 ANNUAL REPORT 68 (2004), available at  
https://www.wachovia.com/file/2004_annualreport.pdf; WACHOVIA, 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2002), available at  
https://www.wachovia.com/file/WB2002annualreport.pdf; WACHOVIA, 2000 ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2000), available at  
https://www.wachovia.com/common_files/fullar2000.pdf  (Wachovia was formed by 
the merger of First Union and the former Wachovia, First Union changed its name 
to Wachovia after the merger).  Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008 and as 
a result, it did not publish a 2008 annual report containing its 2008 leverage ratio.  
For information about its acquisition by Wells Fargo, see WELLS FARGO & CO., 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2008annualreport.
pdf. 
 125. Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 9 (May 22, 2008); 
Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 78 (Mar. 13, 2003); 
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Financial 
Institution 
(Country) 
Leverage Ratio 
(Total Assets divided by Shareholders’ Equity (Deficit)) 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Wells Fargo 
(US)126 
13.2 12.1 10.5 11.8 11.3 11.3 11.5 11.3 10.3 
 
 The above ratios are based on firms’ publicly disclosed financial 
statements, which frequently obscured the true levels of leverage at 
these institutions because accounting rules allowed these entities to 
exclude a host of off-balance sheet commitments.  When these 
commitments are taken into account, the picture can change 
dramatically.  For example, according to the Bridgewater Financial 
Group, Bank of America’s leverage ratio in September 2008 was 134 
to 1 when its off-balance sheet commitments were taken into 
account.127   
In addition, some institutions deliberately manipulated their 
balance sheets to inflate the value of assets and engaged in other 
accounting irregularities.128  For example, Lehman Brothers parked 
$50 billion off of its balance sheets by using Repo 105 transactions, a 
type of repurchase agreement.129  According to Martin Kelly, Lehman 
                                                 
Washington Mut., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 56 (Feb. 20, 2001).  
Washington Mutual was acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 2008 and as a result, 
it did not publish a 2008 annual report containing its 2008 leverage ratio.  For 
information about its acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase, see J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 10–11. 
 126. WELLS FARGO & CO., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 124, at 87; WELLS FARGO 
& CO., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2006), available at  
https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2006annualreport.
pdf; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (2004), available at 
http://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2004annualreport.p
df; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 61 (2002), available at 
http://www.wellsfargo.com/annual2002.pdf; WELLS FARGO & CO., 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT 55 (2001), available at 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/pdf/invest_relations/wf_2001narrative.pdf. 
 127. See Ferguson, supra note 98, at 44, 48. 
 128. Mike Spector, Susanne Craig, & Peter Lattman, Examiner:  Lehman Torpedoed 
Lehman, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115963009594440.h
tml?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews.  
 129. Id.  A repo is a repurchase agreement.  Under a repo, one party sells assets to 
another and agrees that it will buy back those assets within a fixed period of time.  See 
Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis (Feb. 20, 2010), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/crisisqa0210.pdf; Gary 
 Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts 1 (forthcoming, Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 
09-15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447438.  Repos are effectively 
loans of money for very short periods of time with the assets sold serving as collateral, 
which the buyer can sell to someone else if the original seller defaults on its promise 
to repurchase the assets.  U.S. generally accepted accounting practices (U.S. GAAP) 
allow the entity selling the assets to treat the transaction as a “sale” and move the 
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Brothers’ global financial controller, the Repo 105 transactions had 
“no substance” and “the only purpose or motive for the transactions 
was reduction in balance sheet.”130   
Lehman Brothers was not the only financial conglomerate that 
relied heavily on repos and took substantial haircuts131 on the repos 
into which it entered.  All of the financial conglomerates that were 
regulated by the SEC as CSEs relied heavily on repos for funding.  In 
2007 Goldman Sachs had repo transactions on its balance sheet 
worth 3.7 times its total shareholders’ equity or $159.2 billion.132  
After becoming a BHC in 2008, Goldman Sachs reduced the amount 
of repo agreements on its balance sheet to less than its total 
shareholders’ equity, which represented a 60% reduction to $62.9 
billion.133 
Even some FHCs and BHCs regulated by the Federal Reserve used 
repos extensively, although not as much as the CSEs.  Citigroup had 
repo transactions on its balance sheet worth 2.7 times the value of its 
total shareholders’ equity, or $304.2 billion.134  Bank of America had 
repo transactions on its balance sheet worth 1.5 times the value of its 
total shareholders’ equity, or $221.4 billion.135 
The heavy reliance of many financial conglomerates on repos for 
funding and to hide how leveraged they were made them particularly 
vulnerable in the event of a liquidity crisis because if a financial firm’s 
counterparties decided not to renew or rollover the repurchase 
agreements, it could easily bankrupt a firm that relied heavily on 
these agreements as a source of funds.  Lehman Brothers illustrated 
this.  At the end of 2007, Lehman Brothers disclosed that it had 
                                                 
assets given as collateral off of its balance sheet if the value of the assets exceeds 
102% of the cash received for them and a law firm has issued a true sale opinion that 
the transactions meets all of the legal requirements for a sale.  See Spector, Craig, & 
Lattman, supra note 128.  The difference between the value of the assets exchanged 
and the cash received is called a “haircut.”  Gorton, supra, at 12; Gorton & Metrick, 
supra, at 2.  Larger haircuts are required the riskier the buyer considers the 
transaction or the seller.  Gorton, supra, at 12; Gorton & Metrick, supra, at 2.  A Repo 
105 transaction is one in which the value of the assets given as collateral equaled 
105% of the cash received in exchange for the assets.  Spector, Craig, & Lattman, 
supra note 128. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The difference between the value of the assets exchanged and the cash 
received as part of a repurchase agreement is called a “haircut”.  Gorton, supra note 
129, at 12; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 129, at 2. 
 132. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 87 (2007), available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/archived/annual-
reports/2007-annual-report.html. 
 133. GOLDMAN SACHS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 108, at 77. 
 134. Citigroup, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 106 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 135. BANK OF AMERICA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2007), available at 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2007_AR.pdf. 
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$181.7 billion in repo transactions on its balance sheet, up 36% from 
the amount that it held at the end of 2006.136  These repos were worth 
eight times as much as Lehman Brothers’ total shareholders’ 
equity.137  As a result, Lehman Brothers could be, and was, 
bankrupted overnight when its counterparties refused to renew or 
enter into new repurchase agreements with it.138 
Empirical research has found evidence of how the reliance on 
repos put pressure on the financial stability of other conglomerates.139  
This research discovered that, during the financial crisis, repos 
experienced “runs” as counterparties demanded significantly larger 
haircuts in order to enter into such agreements or to renew them.140  
By January 2009, the average repo haircut on securitized bonds and 
other structured debt was about 45%.141  The larger haircuts forced 
many firms to sell assets at the same time, which depressed the prices 
for those assets.142  The firms forced to take these haircuts and engage 
in these sales found themselves in precarious financial positions. 
Repos did not play a direct role in the financial problems of THCs 
like Washington Mutual (WaMu) and of BHCs like Wachovia because 
they did not rely on repos for a significant portion of their funding.143  
Repos, however, did play an indirect role in the troubles of those 
financial institutions because repos helped cause Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse, which in turn led to silent bank runs on WaMu and 
                                                 
 136. LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 79. 
 137. Id. at 79. 
 138. See Gorton, supra note 129, at 12–13 (discussing the increasing size of haircuts 
as creating a run on the repo); Morgan Housel, Lehman Brothers and the Age of 
Stupidity, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/09/11/lehman-brothers-and-the-age-
of-stupidity.aspx. 
 139. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 129, at 1.  
 140. Gorton, supra note 129, at 13.  Haircuts mean that the firms were getting a 
smaller amount of cash for the collateral that they were putting up.  Id. at 12–14.  For 
example, if the firms were putting up $1 trillion but taking a 45% haircut, then they 
would only be receiving $550 billion in exchange for the collateral that they put up.  
In order to make up the $450 billion cash short fall, the firms would have to borrow 
those funds from other sources or sell assets. 
 141. Id. at 13. 
 142. Id. at 5, 12–14. 
 143. WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 10-K 104 (2007) 
(demonstrating that Washington Mutual had only US $4.1 billion in repos at the end 
of 2007, a figure less than half the amount it had at the end of 2006, and 
representing only about 17% of its total shareholders’ equity); WACHOVIA, 2007 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 71, 101 (demonstrating that Wachovia also had a 
small amount of repos, only US $29.3 billion, on its balance sheet at the end of 2007, 
which represented less than 40% of its total shareholders’ equity).  
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Wachovia.144  As a result of these runs, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
purchased WaMu and Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia.145   
B. Lack of Coordination Among Regulators 
The United States did not have a forum or a body to coordinate 
the regulatory and supervisory activities of its vast array of financial 
services regulators to address the unique problems posed by financial 
conglomerates.146  It did have several forums that brought together 
some, but not all, of the financial regulators:  the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets (“the President’s Working Group”), the 
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee 
(FBIIC), the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, the 
North American Securities Administrators’ Association (NASAA), the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), and National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).147   
None of these groups had the authority, jurisdiction or resources 
to ensure the systematic sharing of information between all of 
holding company regulators and the relevant functional or 
institutional regulators.  As a result, it was difficult for the plethora of 
agencies to coordinate their activities and to assess the systemic risks 
                                                 
 144. Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) failed after depositors pulled US $16.7 billion 
out of the bank in the ten days following Lehman Brothers’ collapse.  Robin Sidel, 
David Enrich & Dan Fitzgerald, WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest 
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, 
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html  That represented 
almost 9% of the bank’s total deposits as of its last quarterly report on June 30, 2008.  
Id.  WaMu was in a weakened state before Lehman’s failure as it had posted a second 
quarter 2008 loss of US $3.3 billion and was predicted to lose US $19 billion between 
2008 and 2010 because it held US $53 billion in option adjustable rate mortgages 
and US $16.1 billion in mortgages to subprime borrowers that were some of the most 
vulnerable to defaults.  Id.  After the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and WaMu, 
Wachovia experienced a silent run on the bank as depositors withdrew billions of 
dollars in deposits, including US $5 billion in a single day on September 26, 2008.  
Rick Rothacker, $5 Billion Withdrawn in One Day in Silent Run, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/10/11/246983/5-billion-
withdrawn-in-one-day.html. 
 145. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed 
(Jan. 1, 2009), available at 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wachovia_Merger. 
 146. See Brown, supra note 6, at 28–30. 
 147. See Brown, supra note 6, at 29; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, 
FINANCIAL REGULATION:  INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 97–108 (2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION].  
NAIC, NASAA and CSBS are the associations for the state insurance, securities, and 
banking regulators, respectively.  The Financial Literacy and Education Commission 
was created by Congress to coordinate efforts to educate the public on financial 
matters and is composed of 20 federal agencies, including all of the federal financial 
regulators.  GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra, at 108. 
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to the financial industry as a whole.148  In fact, inter-agency rivalries 
had undermined efforts to expand the scope and composition of 
these groups in order to provide that kind of strategic assessment of 
the financial industry’s risks.149   
With regard to these inter-agency forums, the President’s Working 
Group came the closest to creating a forum for strategically 
addressing the issues facing the financial services industry.  It was this 
entity to which President George W. Bush turned in August 2007 to 
investigate the underlying causes of the financial crisis.150  The 
President’s Working Group was comprised of the Treasury 
Department, the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC.151  It did 
not contain any representatives from the OTS nor from any of state 
banking, securities, or insurance regulators.152 
FFIEC was created on March 10, 1979 as a result of the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.153  
FFIEC is comprised of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the NCUA, the 
OCC, and the OTS, but it does not include the SEC, the CFTC, or 
any representatives from the state securities or insurance regulators.154  
In 2006, the FFIEC added a representative from the State Liaison 
Committee, which includes representatives from the state banking, 
thrift, and credit union regulators, as a new voting member.155  
Consequently, the FFIEC could only deal effectively with a limited 
range of issues because not all state and federal financial regulators 
are members of FFIEC.156 
The FFIEC had limited authority to recommend regulations to 
govern the regulation and supervision of holding companies.157  Its 
mission is to prescribe uniform principles and standards for the 
examination of depository institutions and to coordinate their 
                                                 
 148. GAO FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION REPORT, supra note 64, at 97. 
 149. Brown, supra note 6, at 30. 
 150. THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT 
ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS i (2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_0312200
8.pdf. 
 151. Working Group on Financial Markets, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 22, 1988). 
 152. See id. (denoting the participants of the President’s Working Group:  the 
Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Treasury Department, and the CFTC). 
 153. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 226 (2006)).  
 154. BANKING AGENCY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., JOINT EVALUATION OF 
THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL 3–4 (2002) [hereinafter 
OIG FFIEC REPORT]. 
 155. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov.  
 156. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 10.   
 157. Id. at 9. 
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regulatory efforts.158  Thus, it could only recommend holding 
company regulations to the extent that they pertained to the 
regulation of depository institutions.  In addition, the FFIEC could 
not compel its members to adopt a particular proposal, but served 
only as a coordinating and policy-making entity for its members.159  
Because FFIEC lacked rulemaking authority, each of the relevant 
agencies had to agree to jointly issue rules for any projects requiring 
inter-agency cooperation.160   
Finally, FFIEC’s effectiveness on the issues with which it does deal 
has been contingent on who the members are at a given time.161  A 
2002 joint report of the banking agencies’ Offices of Inspectors 
General evaluating the performance of the FFIEC noted: 
A number of the officials noted that the Council’s success 
depended in large part on the individual principal’s interaction 
and level of commitment to the FFIEC.  One senior agency official 
indicated that while the FFIEC exists in law, in practice the FFIEC 
exists at the consent of the Council and task force members.  One 
principal stated that personal relationships are important at all 
levels of the FFIEC and that without good relationships there is no 
basis for completing interagency projects.162 
As a result, the effectiveness of the FFIEC could be, and on 
occasion was, undermined by cooperation and coordination 
problems. 
FBIIC was created following the September 11, 2001 attacks and 
was tasked with ensuring the preparedness and stability of the 
financial sector in the event of future threats.163  FBIIC drew its 
members from a wider range of financial regulators than either the 
President’s Working Group or FFIEC.  FBIIC is comprised of 
representatives from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, OTS, SEC, 
CFTC, NCUA, NAIC, CSBS, OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance 
Board, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Office of 
Cyberspace Security.164   
Nevertheless, FBIIC’s narrow mission prevented it from having 
much say in how agencies should regulate financial conglomerates.  
FBIIC’s mission is:  “Working with appropriate members of financial 
                                                 
 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. 12 U.S.C. § 3305 (2006). 
 160. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 9. 
 161. Id. at 7.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, 66 Fed. Reg. 
53,063–71 (Oct. 18, 2001). 
 164. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 147, at 107. 
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institution regulatory agencies, coordinate efforts to improve the 
reliability and security of financial information infrastructure.”165  It 
focuses on protecting the financial information infrastructure, which 
only tangentially touches upon financial conglomerate regulation.  
As a result of the absence of any forum encouraging the holding 
company regulators to coordinate their regulations, the holding 
company regulators made little effort to do so.  Consequently, they 
missed opportunities to learn from each other’s experiences and to 
develop a set of best practices for regulating financial conglomerates.  
In addition, the holding company regulators, particularly the OTS 
and the SEC, used the differences in regulatory regimes to compete 
with one another for firms.166  This competition exacerbated the 
regulatory arbitrage problem. 
C. Failure to Understand Risks Posed by Functional Subsidiaries 
The regulatory agencies generally examined the holding 
companies under their supervision on a consolidated basis and 
deferred to the relevant agencies to examine the functional 
subsidiaries in more detail.  This situation was mandated in the laws 
outlining the duties of the agencies under GLBA and other laws.  
When Congress enacted the GLBA, it attempted to preserve the 
regulatory authority of the functional regulators.   
The problem with this system is that the functional regulators were 
not tasked with examining whether the entities that they regulated 
posed risks to the larger financial groups in which they were 
members, or whether they potentially could pose systemic risks.  The 
holding company regulators, who were responsible for determining 
whether the financial conglomerates posed systemic risks, were 
forced to rely on reports concerning subsidiaries by agencies that 
were not drafting them with these risks in mind.  This gap between 
the goals of these different agencies meant that subsidiaries could 
pose systemic risks that would go unnoticed by the relevant 
regulators. 
In addition, as already noted in the case of Enron’s derivative 
subsidiaries, some subsidiaries lacked a functional regulator.  In those 
cases, the financial services holding company regulators had some 
ability to examine those subsidiaries.  The problem in those cases was 
that the financial services holding company regulators often lacked 
                                                 
 165. About FBIIC, Mission, FIN. AND BANKING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE COMM. 
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.fbiic.gov/about/mission.htm. 
 166. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 154. 
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personnel with the expertise to understand those subsidiaries and 
how they operated. 
AIG Financial Products Corp. provides an example of this problem.  
AIG was regulated by the OTS, but its subsidiary, AIG Financial 
Products Corp., was subject to regulation by the SEC.  The SEC, 
however, was only responsible for regulating those parts of its 
business that dealt with securities.  The SEC did not regulate AIG 
Financial Product’s derivative products, such as credit default swaps.  
Prior to 2000, the CFTC was considering regulating derivatives, but, 
as already mentioned, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000 specifically prevented the CFTC or any other federal agency 
from regulating derivatives.  As a result, AIG Financial Products had 
no functional regulator for its derivatives business.   
Evaluating the risks posed by AIG Financial Products’ derivatives 
business fell to the OTS examiners, who supervised AIG as a THC.  
Unfortunately, the OTS lacked personnel with the necessary 
expertise to adequately evaluate the risks posed by the derivatives 
being traded by AIG Financial Products.  The personnel at the OTS 
primarily dealt with savings and loans associations, which offered 
products and services similar to banks.  In connection with evaluating 
these entities, OTS examiners needed to have some understanding of 
derivatives because federal regulations permitted savings and loans 
associations to use derivatives under certain circumstances.167  In 
general, the regulations allowed a savings association to invest in 
financial derivatives if it was “authorized to invest in the assets 
underlying the financial derivative, the transaction is safe and sound,” 
and it met any other requirements in the regulations.168  Savings and 
loans could only invest in derivatives for the purpose of reducing 
their risk exposure.169  The definition of financial derivatives included 
“futures, forward commitments, options, and swaps” but expressly 
excluded all mortgage derivative securities, including collateralized 
mortgage obligations.170  In addition, to the guidance provided by 
these regulations, OTS examiners were given an Examination 
Handbook that provided additional directions for what they were to 
look for with regard to derivatives when examining a savings 
association.171  Even though the regulations excluded mortgage 
                                                 
 167. 12 C.F.R. § 563.172 (2010). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 660.1–.32 (2001) 
[hereinafter OTS, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK] (demonstrating that this handbook was 
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derivative securities from the definition of financial derivatives, the 
Examination Handbook did provide some guidance for how 
examiners should evaluate the use of such instruments by a savings 
association.172  Unfortunately, this guidance was slightly less than a 
page long.173 
The OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook did not provide 
significantly more guidance than that offered by the Examination 
Handbook.  The Holding Companies Handbook was designed to 
provide guidance for OTS examiners who were evaluating risks posed 
by the THCs supervised by OTS.  The handbook contains fewer than 
ten pages that even refer to derivatives.174  Even when it does refer to 
derivatives, it provides little guidance regarding how OTS examiners 
should evaluate the risks posed by such products.  For example, in 
the Risk Management section, the Holding Companies Handbook 
advises examiners that: 
Risk limits are a necessary component of an effective risk 
management program.  You should identify board-approved risk 
limits and ensure that senior management adopts, communicates, 
and monitors operations to ensure compliance with those limits.  
You should verify that the risk limits are commensurate with the 
goals and objectives of the enterprise as well as its financial 
strength and staff expertise.175 
The only time that the Risk Management section specifically 
mentions derivatives is when it notes that it is common for the board 
of directors of the holding company to place size limits on the 
derivatives portfolio.176  In the Earnings section, the handbook 
instructs examiners to look for “high risk, cyclical or off-balance sheet 
activities that could adversely affect the company, causing additional 
pressure on other subsidiaries, including the thrift” and notes that 
derivatives usually fall within this category.177  The section on financial 
conglomerates in the OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook discusses 
derivatives on four of its eighteen pages and in those instances, it is 
                                                 
designed only to provide guidance for an examination of the savings association and 
for evaluating a THC and all of its subsidiaries).  OTS did have another handbook 
that provided guidance for holding company examinations.  OFFICE OF THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK 100 (2009) [hereinafter OTS, HOLDING 
COMPANIES HANDBOOK].    
 172. OTS, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 660.30. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See OTS, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 400.12, 500.7, 
600.4–.5, 940.9, 940.15, 940.17–.18 (demonstrating that the portions of the 
handbook dealing with derivatives date from November 2003 to March 2009).   
 175. Id. at 500.6–.7. 
 176. Id. at 500.7. 
 177. Id. at 600.4–.5. 
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mainly suggesting generic questions that examiners should ask about 
the conglomerate’s derivative positions.178 
The derivatives rules for savings associations found in the 
Examination Handbook and the Holding Companies Handbook did 
not prepare OTS examiners adequately for dealing with the complex 
derivative products offered by AIG Financial Products.  Not only did 
AIG Financial Products invest in collateralized debt obligations 
(“CDOs”) that were similar to collateralized mortgage obligations 
because they were partly backed by mortgage securities, but it 
provided credit default swaps (“CDSs”) for CDOs to protect against 
the decline in value of the mortgage-backed securities upon which 
the CDOs were based.179   
The section of the OTS’s Holding Companies Handbook dealing 
with financial conglomerates recognizes that financial conglomerates 
pose unique challenges and encourages examiners to adopt a 
broader view when examining financial conglomerates.  It notes:  
“[t]his shift from managing along legal entity lines to functional lines 
means that the information and conclusions drawn during the 
examinations of individual entities within the conglomerate may be 
incomplete unless understood in the context of the examination 
findings of other related legal entities or centralized functions.”180  It 
later notes that “[t]he rapidly changing environment of a 
conglomerate means that we will need to increase planning and 
offsite monitoring” but in the very next paragraph it states that OTS 
“will use a more formalized annual supervisory planning process in 
supervising conglomerates.”181  These two statements are at odds with 
one another.  The former would suggest that OTS recognized that 
circumstances of some financial businesses, like derivatives, might 
change rapidly.  Unfortunately, the later statement seems to indicate 
that OTS did not really follow through with this flexible approach but 
relied instead on a rigid, formalistic examination process.   
Even with this formal, annual process, OTS should have been put 
on notice of troubles in AIG Financial Products if it had understood 
the derivatives business.  AIG’s board of directors had requested that 
AIG’s CEO Martin Sullivan impose tighter controls on AIG Financial 
                                                 
 178. See id. at 940.9, 940.15, 940.17–.18 (this part of the handbook dates from 
November 2003 because it was not updated when other sections, like the Risk 
Management section, were updated in March 2009). 
 179. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xxiv–xxv, 273–74 (describing AIG’s 
financial portfolio and its effect on the financial stability of AIG). 
 180. OTS, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK, supra note 171, at 940.1.  
 181. Id.  
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Products as early as 2005, but he never did.182  In addition, AIG 
Financial Products began receiving significant collateral calls in 
connection with its derivatives over a year before AIG’s collapse.183  
AIG Financial Products had invested in subprime mortgage-backed 
securities that became impossible to sell in 2007.184  The OTS, 
however, does not appear to have considered the derivatives business 
of AIG Financial Products as posing a serious threat to the existence 
of AIG and its other subsidiaries during the period from 2005 and 
2008.185  OTS conducted an examination of AIG in March 2008 and 
downgraded its composite rating from a “2” (“fundamentally sound”) 
to a “3” (“moderate to severe supervisory concern”) but concluded 
that it was likely that AIG would remain a viable business.186  Within 
six months, however, AIG had collapsed and been taken over by the 
U.S. government.187 
The lesson from AIG is that holding companies regulators need to 
have the ability to examine all of the subsidiaries of the holding 
companies that they regulate and need to have personnel with the 
requisite expertise to understand these subsidiaries’ businesses.  If 
they had those two things, then they might have uncovered and dealt 
with the problems brewing in some of the troubled conglomerates 
before those problems severely imperiled the firms.   
D. Regulatory Arbitrage 
Prior to the crisis, regulatory arbitrage was cast as “regulatory 
competition” and advocated as a positive feature of the U.S. 
regulatory structure.188  Alan Greenspan argued that regulatory 
arbitrage prevented overregulation because regulators that placed 
“excessive” burdens on firms would lose those firms to other 
agencies.189 
Regulatory arbitrage, however, did not always lead to the right 
amount of regulation; in many instances, it resulted in under-
regulation.  In the case of holding company regulators, regulatory 
arbitrage allowed firms to find the regulator that would be most 
                                                 
 182. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 329 (2010). 
 183. Id. at 330–41. 
 184. Id. at 328.  
 185. See id. at 94–95 (showing that in general, OTS had a blind spot with regard to 
subprime mortgages because while the OCC discouraged the entities that it 
supervised from making subprime loans, the OTS did nothing to deter the thrifts 
and THCs that it supervised from doing so).   
 186. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 274. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 54. 
 189. Id. 
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
2011] THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS  1375 
accommodating to their needs, which usually translated into the 
regulator offering the weakest level of regulation.190  AIG chose to 
own a thrift, rather than a bank, because the OTS would then 
regulate the company as a THC.  AIG perceived the OTS to be a 
weaker regulator than the Federal Reserve.191  The investment banks, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, chose to own industrial loan 
companies or thrifts rather than banks because they wanted to be 
subject to the voluntary regulatory regime of the SEC, which was 
significantly weaker than the regime imposed by the Federal Reserve 
on FHCs and BHCs or the regime imposed by the OTS on THCs.192  
In a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, the CSEs stated that 
they did not want to be regulated by the Federal Reserve because its 
regulation was more comprehensive than either the SEC’s or the 
OTS’s approach.193 
The federal agencies had incentives to compete for firms because 
their budgets and prestige were tied up with how many firms they 
regulated and who they regulated.194  The OTS’s budget was directly 
tied to the assessments that it levied on the firms that it regulated.195  
The SEC also collects fees from the firms that it regulates but it does 
not get to control what portion of those fees that it keeps for 
budgetary purposes.196  The SEC’s budget is set by Congress.197  The 
firms regulated by the SEC have shown no hesitation about 
aggressively lobbying Congress to curtail the SEC’s budget if they 
believe that the SEC is considering imposing regulations that they 
view as burdensome.198   
The Federal Reserve had few incentives to compete with the OTS 
and the SEC because even though fees collected from the banks and 
holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve help fund its 
operations, the vast majority of the Federal Reserve’s revenues come 
from earnings on its portfolio of government securities.199  In 
                                                 
 190. Id. at 40, 352. 
 191. Id. at 352. 
 192. See id. at 150–54 (describing the decision of the five major U.S. investment 
banks to choose to be regulated by the SEC as opposed to other regulating entities). 
 193. Id. at 154. 
 194. Id. at 54. 
 195. Id.  
 196. U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
92 (2010). 
 197. Id.  
 198. Brown, supra note 6, at 51 (describing the lobbying efforts aimed at the SEC’s 
budget in the 1990s to head off new regulations). 
 199. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT:  BUDGET 
REVIEW 1, 25 (2008). 
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addition, the Federal Reserve has complete control over its budget200 
and, therefore, is not subject to the pressures faced by the SEC.  
These two factors made the Federal Reserve less prone to agency 
capture than either the OTS or the SEC.  Consequently, it is not 
surprising that the Federal Reserve would impose stronger 
regulations on the holding companies that it regulated than either 
the OTS or the SEC. 
The impact of regulatory arbitrage can be seen in Table 2, which 
lists the twenty largest financial conglomerates by revenues in 2007.  
Eight of these twenty conglomerates were regulated by either the 
SEC, the OTS, or both, and not by the Federal Reserve.  The OTS 
and the SEC lacked the budgetary resources, the personnel, and the 
experience of the Federal Reserve.  These eight financial 
conglomerates deliberately chose the OTS and the SEC because they 
believed that the OTS and the SEC would allow them to engage in 
activities, such as higher levels of leverage in the case of the SEC and 
the CSEs under its supervision, than the Federal Reserve would have 
allowed.201 
  
                                                 
 200. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE’S ACTION DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (2010) (noting that the 
Federal Reserve is not  subject to the appropriations process and  it is able to operate 
independently from government influence). 
 201. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 151–54 (discussing the positive reaction 
of the investment banks to the creation of the CSE program and how it differed from 
banking regulations); see also SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4 (“The firms 
agreed to consolidated supervision because of the preferential capital treatment 
under the alternative method and international requirements.”); id. at 19–20 (noting 
that the SEC had not imposed a leverage limit on the CSEs unlike the banking 
regulators who had imposed leverage limits on banks).  
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Table 2:  Twenty Largest Financial Conglomerates by Revenue in 2007202 
Name Primary 
Industry 
Sector 
Revenues as 
of 2007  
($ millions) 
Profits as of 
2007 
($ millions) 
Federal 
Holding 
Company 
Regulators 
General 
Electric 
Company 
Diversified 
Financial 
176,656 22,208 OTS
Citigroup Banking 159,229 3,617 Federal 
Reserve, SEC 
Bank of 
America Corp. 
Banking 119,190 14,982 Federal 
Reserve 
Berkshire 
Hathaway 
Insurance 118,245 13,213 None 
JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. 
Banking 116,353 15,365 Federal 
Reserve, SEC 
American 
International 
Group 
Insurance 110,064 6,200 OTS
Goldman Sachs 
Group 
Securities 87,968 11,599 SEC
Morgan Stanley Securities 87,879 3,209 SEC, OTS 
Merrill Lynch Securities 64,217 (7,777) SEC, OTS 
State Farm 
Insurance Cos. 
Insurance 61,612 5,464 Federal 
Reserve 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
Securities 59,003 4,192 SEC, OTS 
Wachovia Corp. Banking 55,528 6,312 Federal 
Reserve 
Wells Fargo Banking 53,593 8,057 Federal 
Reserve 
MetLife Insurance 53,150 4,317 Federal 
Reserve 
Fannie Mae Diversified 
Financial 
43,355 (2,050) OHFEO  
                                                 
 202. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 17, at 9; Bank Holding Companies Name List, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/banking/financial_institution_rep
orts/bhc_name.txt (last visited Apr. 25, 2011); Financial Holding Companies as of Mar 
23, 2011, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); GAO 
FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION REPORT, supra note 64, at 12; Institution Directory, 
FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
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Name Primary 
Industry 
Sector 
Revenues as 
of 2007  
($ millions) 
Profits as of 
2007 
($ millions) 
Federal 
Holding 
Company 
Regulators 
Freddie Mac Diversified 
Financial 
43,104 (3,094) OHFEO 
Allstate Insurance 36,769 4,636 Federal 
Reserve 
Prudential 
Financial 
Insurance 34,401 3,704 OTS
American 
Express 
Diversified 
Financial 
32,316 4,012 Federal 
Reserve 
GMAC Diversified 
Financial 
31,490 (2,332) OTS
 
At the end of the day, domestic regulatory arbitrage provides a 
partial explanation regarding why competing firms were regulated by 
different agencies and subject to different regulatory standards, as 
discussed in Part II.A above.  Another part of the puzzle comes from 
international regulatory arbitrage. 
During the decade leading up to the crisis, the competition among 
U.S. domestic regulators was made more contentious by the fact that 
the United States and the United Kingdom were engaged in a 
struggle to see who would be the primary financial services 
marketplace in the world.  Private groups and government officials 
conducted major studies on competitiveness to assess the relative 
advantages of the United Kingdom and the United States.203 
                                                 
 203. For some examples of these reports, see HM TREASURY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN 
LONDON:  GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2006), available at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/1E0/E6/bud06_cityoflondon_262.pdf  [hereinafter UK 
TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT]; MCKINSEY & CO. & NEW YORK CITY ECON. DEV. 
CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 
(2007), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/
NY_Schumer-Bloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf.; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., 
INTERIM REPORT (2006); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF 
THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (2007) [hereinafter COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., 
COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT]; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007); RICHARD M. 
KOVACEVICH ET. AL., THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007); 
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny:  Is the Financial 
Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
369 (2008); Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 
U. CHI L. REV. 1435 (2008); Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global 
Securities Market, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 111 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards 
the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM L. REV. 1757 (2002); James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. 
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This competition between the United Kingdom and the United 
States tended to focus on a relatively narrow range of financial 
products and services, such as securities and stock exchanges.204  It 
frequently was reduced to nothing more than a competition between 
London and New York for which had the most listed companies on its 
stock exchanges.   
Because of this focus on securities, the SEC was particularly keen to 
help U.S. financial conglomerates, like the investment banks Bear 
Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley.  It 
not only created the CSE regulatory structure for them so that they 
could avoid being regulated under the EU Financial Conglomerate 
Directive, but it set significantly lower capital requirements for them 
than those imposed by the Federal Reserve on FHCs and BHCs.205 
It is worth noting that this competition was not really about 
competition between American and British financial firms.  American 
financial conglomerates often were the ones pushing this 
competition—and the deregulation that it sought to foster—on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Prior to the financial crisis, branches or 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, many of which were American, 
comprised over 75% of the banks authorized to do business within 
the United Kingdom.206  In the wake of the Big Bang, pursuant to 
which the U.K. government significantly deregulated the country’s 
financial markets, foreign firms acquired or put out of business most 
of the major U.K. investment banks.207  Barclays’ acquisition of large 
                                                 
Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 157 (1992); Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. 
L. REV. 89 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 
105 MICH L. REV. 1858 (2007); Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory 
Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 7 (2005); Peter Hostak et al., An Examination of the 
Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign 
Firms (Apr. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956020; Eric J. Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts its Stock in 
Us (forthcoming, Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, 
Working Paper No. 176, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951705. 
 204. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REP., supra note 203; 
Brummer, supra note 203; Choi, supra note 203; Coffee, supra note 203; Cox, supra 
note 203; Davidoff, supra note 203; Litvak, supra note 203; Ribstein, supra note 203. 
 205. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 151 (discussing the lobbying of the 
investment banks for the creation of the CSE program because of concerns about the 
EU Conglomerates Directive); see also SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4 
(discussing the creation of the CSE program as a result of the EU Conglomerates 
Directive); id. at 19–20 (noting that the SEC had not imposed a leverage limit on the 
CSEs unlike the banking regulators who had imposed leverage limits on banks). 
 206. UK TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 203, at 8. 
 207. DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON, VOLUME IV:  A CITY NO MORE 1945–
2000, at 735, 782–83 (2001).  
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portions of Lehman Brothers following its financial collapse in 
September 2008 was the only major deviation from this trend.208  
Thus, if Congress or the U.S. regulatory agencies truly wanted to 
decrease regulatory arbitrage, they would need to focus both on 
domestic regulatory arbitrage and on international regulatory 
arbitrage.   
Addressing international regulatory arbitrage would require new 
international agreements, not just domestic legislation.  International 
agreements, like Basel II Capital Accord,209 are helpful because they 
attempt to harmonize the regulatory requirements across countries 
and thus reduce the ability of firms to play national regulators off 
each other and reduce the incentives for firms to switch regulators.  
Several international forums already exist to promote financial 
regulatory harmonization.  Among the major ones in the areas of 
banking, insurance, and securities are the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, which focuses on banking regulations,210 the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which 
focuses on insurance,211 and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which focuses on securities 
regulation.212  These organizations are international standards-setting 
bodies.  The agreements that they have produced are considered 
“soft law” because the standards that they set are nonbinding.213  
Nevertheless, these organizations have helped push the national 
standards of their member countries towards a uniform set of 
standards in the areas of banking, insurance, and securities. 
                                                 
 208. Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Barclays to Acquire Lehman Brothers’ 
Businesses and Assets (Sept. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/0916_barclays_acquisition.pdf. 
 209. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS—A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n. 5 (June 2004).   
 210. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, About the Basel Committee, http://bis.org/bcbs/ 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
 211. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, http://iaisweb.org (last visited Mar. 10, 
2011). 
 212. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, General Information, 
 http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
 213. See Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, the G10 Committees, and 
International Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 869, 877 (2009) (discussing the 
Basel Committee’s use of soft law and use of standards by IAIS and IOSCO); 
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance Regulation, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 963–70 (2009) (discussing IAIS standards); Henry Deeb 
Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law:  The Role of 
UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 655, 658–60 
(2009) (definition of soft law); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of 
Soft Law in Securities Regulations, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 898–900 (2009) (discussing 
IOSCO’s use of standards and recommendations).  
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E. Failure to Adequately Address the “Too Big to Fail” Problem 
In recent decades, a large number of mergers and acquisitions 
were taking place within the financial services industry.  As a result, 
the assets in each of the major sectors—banking, securities, and 
insurance—became concentrated within fewer firms.  This trend 
began in the 1990s and accelerated after the enactment of GLBA and 
the adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994,214 which eliminated the barriers to interstate 
banking.  Table 3 chronicles the hundreds of financial sector mergers 
worth almost $1.7 trillion during the decade prior to the financial 
crisis.  Such mergers allow BHCs to be more diversified both 
geographically and across economic sectors.215  Regulators thought 
that this would be advantageous as it tended to make them less 
vulnerable to regional or sectoral slumps.216  They tended, however, to 
ignore or underestimate the potential downsides of such growth. 
Table 3:  Number and Value of Announced Financial Mergers and 
Acquisitions217 
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 214. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1997)). 
 215. Dean Foust, Commentary:  If This Safety Net Snaps, Who Pays?, BUS. WK., Apr. 27, 
1998, http://www.businessweek.com/1998/17/b3575005.htm. 
 216. Id. 
 217. INS. INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, at 3 (2005); INS. 
INFO. INST., THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2010, at 3 (2010). 
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One of those downsides was the growing belief among large 
financial firms and their creditors that national politicians would not 
allow the firms to fail because the politicians and regulators would 
deem the economic and politic costs of doing so to be too great.218  
This phenomenon is called the “too big to fail” problem.  The 
phrase, “too big to fail,” should not be taken literally because it does 
not refer only to extremely large banks.  “Too big to fail” also covers 
firms that may not be very large, but are so highly intertwined with 
other financial institutions that their failure would start a cascade of 
failures throughout the financial system that would be catastrophic 
for the economy.219 
What are some of the potential costs of allowing “too big to fail” 
institutions to go bankrupt?  They include the failure of other banks 
and financial institutions, a seizing up of the basic functions of the 
financial system, and a decline in the economy.220   
On the other hand, not allowing large or highly interconnected 
firms to fail creates a moral hazard problem as creditors no longer 
feel the need to adequately monitor and assess the risks posed by 
such financial firms.221  If creditors properly evaluated the risks posed 
by such institutions, they would charge them higher prices as the 
firms’ activities become riskier.222  Because the creditors fail to 
properly monitor firms that they believe are too big to fail, those 
firms receive the wrong price and quantity signals, which in turn 
leads them to engage in excessive risk-taking and a misallocation of 
resources.223  Being considered too big to fail, thus, is beneficial for 
firms because it lowers the firm’s cost of capital, which raises its 
profits or reduces its losses.   
In light of this, it is not surprising that one of the motivations 
posited for the large number of mergers in the 1990s was that banks 
were actively seeking to become too big to fail.  When looking solely 
at the information embedded in share prices, the evidence that this 
                                                 
 218. GARY H. STERN & RON FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:  THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS 1–2, 12–17 (2004).  “‘We have created financial institutions that are too big 
to fail,’ says Henry Kaufman, the former Salomon Brothers economist known as ‘Dr. 
Doom’ for saying things the Street doesn’t like to hear.  ‘They are not submitted to 
the full discipline of the marketplace,’ he adds.”  Michelle Celarier, The God That 
Failed, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIGEST, Sept. 9, 2002, at 26.  
 219. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 16. 
 220. Id. at 12–13. 
 221. Id. at 17. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 17–18. 
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was, in fact, a motivation for bank mergers was mixed.224  When 
looking at bond prices, however, evidence was found that the desire 
to become too big to fail was a motivating factor.225  Research on the 
relationship between bank mergers and bond prices from 2001 
illustrated that medium-size banks (those with between $30 billion 
and $100 billion in assets) experienced significant bond returns and 
realized reductions in costs of funds following announcements that 
they intended to merge with another bank, particularly when the 
merger would result in the combined bank’s assets exceeding $100 
billion.226  On the other hand, this research also showed that mega-
banks (those that can be considered already too big to fail at the time 
of the merger) and smaller banks (combined mean asset size of $30 
billion or less) earned less return than bondholders of medium-size 
banks.227 
In the case of commercial banks, the “too big to fail” belief was 
created by the federal assistance given to Continental Illinois 
National Bank and Trust Company, which was the seventh-largest 
U.S. bank at the time when it failed in 1984.228  In order to stop a run 
on Continental Illinois, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC 
agreed that they would put together a package that included a $2 
billion capital infusion, of which $1.5 billion came from the FDIC 
and the remaining $500 million from a group of commercial banks 
organized by the FDIC, a promise by the Federal Reserve that it 
would meet Continental Illinois’s liquidity needs, and a promise by 
the FDIC to ignore its $100,000 cap on deposit insurance and to 
                                                 
 224. See George J. Benston, William C. Hunter & Larry D. Wall, Motivations for 
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions:  Enhancing the Deposit Insurance Put Option versus Earnings 
Diversification, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 777, 778 (1995) (finding that acquirers 
would not pay more for riskier banks whose returns are correlated with the acquirer’s 
returns in order to become too big to fail as opposed to banks that offered earnings 
diversification); Gayle L. DeLong, Stockholder Gains From Focusing versus Diversifying 
Bank Mergers, 59 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 226, 250 (2001) (reporting no significant 
relationship between combined bank size and abnormal equity returns realized at 
the time of the merger announcement for bank mergers occurring in the period 
from 1988 to 1995); Edward J. Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergers:  What Motives 
Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671, 
673 (2000) (arguing that evidence showing a positive correlation between equity 
returns of acquirer and the size of its target supports the view that one motive for 
bank mergers is to become too big to fail).  
 225. Maria Fabiana Penas & Haluk Unal, Gains in Bank Mergers:  Evidence from the 
Bond Markets, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 149, 150–51 (2004). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 13; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF 
THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE vol. 1, 235–36 (1997), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf. 
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protect all of Continental Illinois’s deposits.229  In addition, the 
federal regulators tried to find a merger partner for Continental 
Illinois but when those efforts failed, they put the bank into a unique 
resolution process, which included the FDIC buying $4.5 billion in 
bad loans from the bank and acquiring $1 billion in preferred stock 
in Continental Illinois’s holding company, Continental Illinois 
Corporation.230  The FDIC required the holding company to give the 
$1 billion that it had received in exchange for the stock, to 
Continental Illinois.231  Effectively, through this resolution process, 
the federal government had acquired an 80% ownership interest in 
the firm.232 
The assistance provided to Long Term Capital Management 
(“LTCM”) extended the pool of firms deemed to be “too big to fail” 
beyond banking to any financial service firm that was considered too 
large or too interconnected with other firms to be allowed to go 
bankrupt.233  Such interconnectedness might cause a ripple effect 
throughout the financial system, which would force other firms to 
collapse.  LTCM was a hedge fund that initially specialized in high-
volume arbitrage trades in bond and bond-derivatives markets, but 
eventually began to engage in other markets and in speculation.234  By 
the end of 1997, LTCM had developed an impressive track record 
with an average annual rate of return of approximately 40%.235  
LTCM’s assets had grown to $120 billion and its capital had grown to 
about $7.3 billion by 1997, making it one of the largest hedge funds 
in the United States.236 
When the financial markets deteriorated in the summer of 1998, 
LTCM suffered substantial losses, which led to a 33% decline in the 
firm’s assets to $80 billion and a 92% decline in the firm’s capital to 
$600 million by September 19, 1998.237 
Amidst growing concerns about the likely failure of LTCM, the 
Federal Reserve arranged for fourteen banks, which were also major 
creditors of LTCM, to provide LTCM with a rescue package that 
allowed shareholders to retain a 10% holding in LTCM, which was 
                                                 
 229. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, 
supra note 228, at 243–44. 
 230. Id. at 244. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 247–48. 
 233. DOWD, supra note 28, at 2. 
 234. Id. at 3. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 3–4. 
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valued at $400 million, while the consortium invested an additional 
$3.65 billion in equity capital in LTCM in exchange for 90% of the 
firm’s equity.238 
The bailout of LTCM was without precedent as the Federal Reserve 
had no authority to regulate hedge funds.  Hedge funds at that time 
did not have a functional regulator.239  The SEC could not regulate 
LTCM because it fit within exemptions from regulation under the 
Securities Act of 1933,240 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,241 and 
the Investment Company Act of 1940242 for hedge funds with fewer 
than 100 shareholders.243  In fact, the majority of U.S. hedge funds 
restricted the number of their shareholders to fewer than 100 to 
avoid being regulated.244  In addition, no other federal agency had 
the authority to regulate hedge funds.245  
The LTCM rescue created the perception that the Federal Reserve 
has assumed responsibility for bailing out all large financial firms 
when they got themselves into financial difficulties, even when the 
Federal Reserve lacked any statutory authority to do so.246  This 
position allowed large financial conglomerates to take huge risks that 
the Federal Reserve and other regulators could do little to prevent.247 
This perception that the Federal Reserve would bail out financially 
troubled institutions was not affected by the refusal of the Federal 
Reserve to intervene to save Enron in 2001.  Why did the failure of 
the Federal Reserve to help Enron not lower market expectations 
regarding future government bailouts?  This question is relevant 
because, from the viewpoint of some commentators, Enron’s failure 
posed a greater risk to the economy than LTCM’s failure would 
have.248  Frank Partnoy testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Government Affairs that “Enron makes Long-Term Capital 
Management look like a lemonade stand” because Enron made more 
                                                 
 238. Id. at 4–5. 
 239. Id. at 2–3. 
 240. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 242. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006).  
 243. DOWD, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
 244. Id. at 3. 
 245. See JOHN HUNT, HEDGE FUND REGULATION:  THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP 
COMMITTEES’ BEST PRACTICE REPORTS—RAISING THE BAR BUT MISSING RISKS 4–6 
(Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy, June 2008) (discussing history 
of proposed hedge fund regulations since LTCM and the lack of new mandatory 
regulations prior to 2008); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  
The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 979–90 
(2006) (discussing the SEC as the sole regulator of hedge funds).  
 246. DOWD, supra note 28, at 3. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
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money trading derivatives in 2000 than LTCM made during its 
existence, Enron had 100 times as many employees as LTCM (Enron 
had 20,000 while LTCM had only 200), and Enron lost over $70 
billion in shareholders’ equity plus billions in funds owed to creditors 
while LTCM only lost $4.6 billion.249   
Given those metrics, if the Federal Reserve felt justified in 
intervening to save LTCM, why did it reach a different conclusion 
with Enron?  The answer probably rests on four factors.  First, Enron 
was not primarily viewed as a financial firm, unlike LTCM.250  Enron 
had started out as an energy company when it was created in 1985, 
and, while its derivatives business was extremely large, Enron still 
earned over 90% of its total revenues from other sources in 2000.251  
Second, each of the fourteen financial firms that interceded to save 
LTCM had large exposures because they had lent sizable sums to 
LTCM that they stood to lose if LTCM went under.252  The major U.S. 
and European financial firms did not have the same exposures to 
Enron and, thus, would not have suffered the same level of losses if 
Enron failed.253   
Third, by the time Enron sought federal aid in October of 2001, its 
assets and derivatives position were nowhere near what they had been 
at the end of 2000.254  By the end of its third quarter of 2001, Enron’s 
derivatives position equaled only $19 billion, roughly one-fifth of the 
$1 trillion derivatives book that LTCM had.255  As a result, federal 
regulators probably concluded that Enron’s collapse did not pose the 
same threat that LTCM’s potential collapse had posed.   
Fourth, Enron’s headquarters was located in Houston, not New 
York, which meant that Enron did not have the access to cultivate the 
same types of cozy relationships with the Federal Reserve that LTCM 
had.256  Kenneth Lay, the Chairman of Enron, had certainly sought 
help from both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department to 
secure Enron the same treatment that LTCM had received, but to no 
avail.257 
                                                 
 249. Id. 
 250. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 324–26. 
 251. Id. at 241; Partnoy Hearing, supra note 23, at 2. 
 252. BRYCE, supra note 23, at 325. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id.  From February 2000 to January 2002, Jeff Skilling, Enron’s CEO, was on 
the Houston branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.  Id. at 324. 
 257. Id. at 324–26.  Lay had spoken with Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve 
Chairman, and Paul O’Neill, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, but neither apparently 
were willing to come to Enron’s aid.  Id.   
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The significant differences between Enron and LTCM probably 
enabled at least some market participants to write off Enron as an 
aberration.  Thus, they continued to believe that firms that were 
generally viewed by the financial markets as “too big to fail” would be 
bailed out by the federal government.  This belief was confirmed 
when the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury engineered J.P. 
Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns for $2 per share in March 
of 2008.258  As a result, the financial markets expected that the federal 
government would provide assistance to any financial conglomerate 
that was at least as large as Bear Stearns, which was the fifth-largest 
investment banking conglomerate in the United States.259   
The upending of those expectations when the federal government 
allowed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the second largest 
investment banking conglomerate in the United States, contributed 
to the panic in the financial markets.260  Ultimately, Lehman Brothers 
was the only large U.S. financial conglomerate that was allowed to 
fail.  For all of the others, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve either 
provided bailout funds or assisted in arranging a merger of the 
struggling firm with a healthier firm.  Consequently, the financial 
crisis has solidified the proposition that the federal government 
would rescue “too big to fail” financial firms for financial markets and 
in the minds of the public. 
F. These Problems Were Foreseen  
All of these problems could have been and, in many cases, were 
foreseen well in advance of the recent financial crisis.  The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission listed as its first conclusion that the 
                                                 
 258. MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 182, at 347–48. 
 259. See id. at 349–51, 357, 359; ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 6, 239–44 
(2009). 
 260. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xxi.  Prior to Lehman Brothers’ collapse, 
major market participants, like J.P. Morgan Chase, held some expectation that the 
federal government might arrange a rescue package for Lehman Brothers like the 
one that they had provided for LTCM.  See SORKIN, supra note 259, at 242–43 
(discussing telephone conversations between Steven Black of J.P. Morgan Chase and 
Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers concerning federal aid for Lehman Brothers).   
Barclays and Bank of America specifically asked for government assistance as a 
condition for them to go forward with an acquisition of Lehman Brothers.  Id. at 
278–79.  Treasury Secretary Paulson, however, was not willing to provide federal 
government funds to bail out Lehman Brothers in the same manner that the federal 
government had bailed out Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac because the 
political backlash that had erupted over the bailouts for the GSEs.  Id. at 282–83.  In 
the end, Lehman Brothers was unable to arrange a merger with either Barclays or 
Bank of America and filed for bankruptcy.  The financial markets reacted with panic.  
Id. at 390, 393–94. 
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financial crisis was “avoidable” because there were “warning signs.”261  
These warning signs included the excessive risks that financial firms 
had undertaken such as the “explosion in risky subprime lending and 
securitization,” “egregious and predatory lending practices,” and the 
“exponential growth in financial firms’ trading activities, unregulated 
derivatives, and short-term ‘repo’ lending markets.”262  Most of the 
major financial conglomerates had engaged in all of these 
practices.263   
Not only were there signs of danger, but government officials and 
academics had warned about these problems well before the crisis 
broke.  For instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) published reports for more than a decade warning about the 
need for regulatory reform to deal with systemic risks posed by 
financial conglomerates, inconsistent financial regulations, regulatory 
arbitrage, a lack of coordination among regulators, and other 
problems that contributed to the crisis.264  Another example is Gary 
H. Stern, then the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minnesota, and Ron Feldman, then a vice-president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minnesota, who in 2004 published, Too Big to Fail:  
The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, in which they discussed the hazards 
posed to the financial system of creditors’ expectations that large 
financial firms would be bailed out by the federal government.265  
Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 
to 1987, wrote the foreword to this book and noted that: 
The broader concern is the perceived sense of growing “moral 
hazard,” specifically the possibility that confident expectations of 
creditor “bailouts” will dull normal market discipline.  Inherently, a 
protected creditor will have less incentive for “due diligence,” with 
                                                 
 261. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xvii. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at xvii, xix–xx, 31–32, 68–71, 150–51. 
 264. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-214, BANKS’ SECURITIES 
ACTIVITIES:  OVERSIGHT DIFFERS DEPENDING ON ACTIVITY AND REGULATOR 4–5 (1995)  
(noting different levels of oversight, weak enforcement by Federal Reserve for 
noncompliance of firewall protections between securities and banking, and lack of 
training for FDIC examiners dealing with securities subsidiaries); GAO FINANCIAL 
REGULATION, supra note 147, at 8, 10 (discussing problems with sharing of 
information and coordinating regulatory responses among multiple agencies, 
regulatory arbitrage, and the dangers posed by systemic risks); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-32, FINANCIAL REGULATION:  INDUSTRY TRENDS 
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 26 (2007) (reiterating 
some of the findings of the 2004 report and noting the problems posed by the 
federal agencies handled consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates). 
 265. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at 60–79.  
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the perverse result of encouraging excessive risk-taking and failure 
itself.266 
As noted above, scholars found evidence in the bond markets of 
creditors’ expectations that large financial institutions would be 
bailed out by the federal government.267  The reason that they were 
not dealt with was not a lack of imagination but a lack of political will 
and pressure from the financial services to preserve the regulatory 
status from which they profited immensely.268 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Dodd-Frank Act took three steps to address the problems 
posed by financial conglomerates.  First, it reduced the ability of 
financial conglomerates to engage in regulatory arbitrage and 
provided mechanisms to ensure that systemically important financial 
conglomerates are regulated by the Federal Reserve.  Second, it 
improved supervision of financial conglomerates by, among other 
things, establishing uniform capital adequacy standards for financial 
conglomerates.  Third, it took some steps to minimize the “too big to 
fail” problem.  Each one of these actions will be addressed in more 
detail below.   
A. Reduced Ability of Financial Conglomerates to Pick Their Regulator 
The Dodd-Frank Act reduced the ability of financial conglomerates 
to pick their regulator by making it extremely unlikely that  
financial conglomerates, at least systemically important financial 
conglomerates, would be regulated on a consolidated basis by any 
agency other than the Federal Reserve.  It accomplishes this by taking 
four actions. 
1. Eliminating the OTS as a holding company regulator   
The Enhancing Financial Institution Safety and Soundness Act of 
2010, which comprises Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act, transfers all of 
the power of the OTS to regulate thrifts to OCC and transfers all of 
the power of the OTS to regulate thrift holding companies to the 
                                                 
 266. Paul A. Volcker, Foreword to STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 218, at ix. 
 267. Penas & Unal, supra note 225, at 150–51. 
 268. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at xviii, 41–42, 55 (stating that between 1999 
and 2008 the financial sector spent over $2.7 billion on lobbying); MCLEAN & 
NOCERA, supra note 182, at 40–42, 63–68, 174–76 (discussing the amount of lobbying 
done by the GSEs and the firms trading derivatives to prevent stricter regulation of 
their activities). 
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Federal Reserve.269  This transfer is to be completed within one year of 
the date of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, unless the Treasury 
Secretary, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the OTS, 
the FDIC Chairperson, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors all agree to an extension.270  Any extension is 
limited to an additional six months.271  In other words, this transfer 
must take place by July 21, 2011, unless an extension is granted and if 
an extension is granted, by no later than January 21, 2012.272  This 
action addresses the way some investment banks and other financial 
firms, like Merrill Lynch and AIG, avoided being regulated by the 
Federal Reserve as FHCs or BHCs while still being able to offer 
banking products by acquiring a thrift.  Closing down the OTS 
effectively kills that option. 
2. Eliminating the SEC as a holding company regulator 
The Dodd-Frank Act ends any remaining authority of the SEC to 
regulate financial conglomerates as holding companies.  It does this 
by eliminating the ability of investment banking holding companies 
to voluntarily select the SEC to regulate them on a consolidated basis 
and by requiring securities holding companies to be regulated by the 
Federal Reserve.273  This change is not as significant as the closing of 
                                                 
 269. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–22 (2010) 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412). 
 270. Id. § 311, at 1520–21 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5411). 
 271. Id. 
 272. The Dodd-Frank Act was signed by the President and became law on July 21, 
2010.  H.R. 4173:  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2011) (tracking legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 273. Dodd-Frank Act § 617, 124 Stat. 1616 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q) 
(eliminating 15 U.S.C. § 78q(i) and giving the Federal Reserve the power to regulate 
securities holding companies).  A “securities holding company” is defined in the 
statute as: 
  (i) a person (other than a natural person) that owns or controls 1 or 
more brokers or dealers registered with the Commission; and 
  (ii) the associated persons of a person described in clause (i); and 
(B) does not include a person that is— 
  (i) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board under title I; 
  (ii) an insured bank (other than an institution described in 
subparagraphs (D), (F), or (H) of section 2(c)(2) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)) or a savings association; 
  (iii) an affiliate of an insured bank (other than an institution described 
in subparagraphs (D), (F), or (H) of section 2(c)(2) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)) or an affiliate of a savings 
association; 
  (iv) a foreign bank, foreign company, or company that is described in 
section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106(a)); 
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the OTS and the transferring of its powers to the Federal Reserve and 
the OCC.  The SEC had ended its CSE program on September 26, 
2008 after the SEC’s Inspector General released a report 
documenting how the program had contributed to the financial 
difficulties of Bear Stearns.274  At that time, all of the investment 
banking conglomerates that the SEC had regulated had either been 
acquired by FHCs regulated by the Federal Reserve (Bear Stearns and 
Merrill Lynch), collapsed (Lehman Brothers), or had voluntarily 
subjected themselves to the regulatory authority of the Federal 
Reserve by beginning the process to become FHCs (Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley).275  Section 617 of the Dodd-Frank Act merely 
prevents the SEC from ever resurrecting its CSE program or creating 
any similar program in the future. 
3. Preventing certain BHCs from evading regulation by the Federal Reserve 
The Dodd-Frank Act prevents any financial conglomerate that 
became a FHC or BHC and received TARP funds from avoiding 
regulation by the Federal Reserve by spinning off or changing the 
charter of any banking subsidiary.276  The summary of the Act released 
by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
nicknames this provision the “Hotel California” provision, which 
seems to refer to the last lines of the title song of the Eagles’ Hotel 
California album (“You can check out any time you like, but you can 
never leave”), but other commentators have referred to it as the 
“roach motel” provision because you can check in, but you can’t 
check out.277   
                                                 
  (v) a foreign bank that controls, directly or indirectly, a corporation 
chartered under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 611 et 
seq.); or 
  (vi) subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision by a foreign 
regulator. 
Id. § 618(a)(4), at 1617 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1850a). 
 274. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox 
Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entity Program (Sept. 26, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm.  
 275. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill is Sold, 
AIG Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Robert Schroeder, Goldman, 
Morgan to Become Holding Companies, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-
holding-companies; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan Acts to Buy 
Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/business/16cnd-
bear.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=JP%20morgan%20to%20acquire%20bear%20stearns%20
2008&st=cse. 
 276. Dodd-Frank Act § 617, 124 Stat. 1616 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q). 
 277. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 111ST CONG., BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
1392 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1339 
This provision applies to any BHC or FHC that had more than $50 
billion in total consolidated assets on January 1, 2010 and received 
any funds under the TARP program and any successor entity.278  If 
such a BHC or FHC divests itself of its bank, changes its charter to 
that of another depository institution that is not subject to the Bank 
Holding Company Act, or ceases to be a BHC by any other means, it 
would continue to be subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as 
a “nonbank financial company.”279  
The Act defines a “nonbank financial company” as a company that 
is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”280  Under the Act, a 
firm will be deemed to be “predominantly engaged in financial 
activities” if 85% of its gross revenues on a consolidated basis or 85% 
of its total assets on a consolidated basis are derived from “financial 
activities” as that term is defined in subsection 4(k) of the BHCA.281  
The Act does not specify during what time period that company must 
                                                 
available at  
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform
_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf; Edmund L. Andrews, Financial Regulation—Not 
as Ugly as it Looks, CAPITALGAINSANDGAMES (Mar. 16, 2010), 
 http://www.capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/edmund-l-andrews/1579/financial-
regulation-not-ugly-it-looks; THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA 
(Elektra Entertainment 1976). 
 278. Dodd-Frank Act § 117(a), 124 Stat. 1406–07 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
5327). 
 279. Id. § 117(b), at 1407 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327).  The term, 
“nonbank financial company,” is defined as any foreign company that would not be 
classified as a BHC and that is “predominantly” engaged in any financial activities 
within the United States and any U.S. company that would not be classified as a BHC 
or Farm Credit System institution, national securities exchange, clearing agency, 
security-based swap execution facility, or security-based swap data repository 
registered with the SEC, board of trade designated as a contract market, a derivatives 
clearing organization, swap execution facility or a swap data repository registered 
with the CFTC, or any parents of such entities, except in certain circumstances when 
the parent is a BHC, and that is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”  Id. § 
102(a)(4), at 1391 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311). 
 280. Id. § 102(a)(6), at 1391–92 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311). 
 281. Id.  Section 4(k) of BHCA states: 
(k) Engaging in activities that are financial in nature 
  (1) In General 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a financial holding company 
may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of any 
company engaged in any activity, that the [Federal Reserve] Board, in 
accordance with paragraph (2), determines (by regulation or order)— 
  (A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or 
  (B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a 
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or 
the financial system generally. 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2006).  Section (k)(4) of the BHCA also provides an 
extensive laundry list of activities that the act considers to be “financial in nature.”  
Id. § 1843(k)(4).    These activities encompass all of the activities generally associated 
with the banking, securities, and insurance businesses. 
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possess this level of gross revenues or total assets from financial 
activities.  The Federal Reserve issued a proposed rulemaking in 
February that would make the determination of how much of a 
company’s gross revenues or total assets came from financial activities 
based on the data available in the most recent two years of the 
company’s consolidated financial statements.282   
The Financial Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC), an interagency 
body created by the Dodd-Frank Act to promote financial stability, 
normally must approve classifying an entity as a nonbank financial 
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.283  This FSOC 
approval, however, would not be required to classify any of the firms 
covered by the Hotel California provision as a nonbank financial 
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve if it ceases to 
be a BHC or FHC.284 
Only thirty-six FHCs and BHCs had more than $50 billion in total 
assets on December 31, 2010.285  Of these holding companies, only 
twenty-four of them accepted TARP funds through the Capital 
Purchase Program.286  Thus, only those twenty-four firms and their 
successors will be subject to the Hotel California provision. 
The differences in the amount of total assets of each of the firms 
subject to the Hotel California provision is rather wide, with the 
largest firm controlling more than forty-four times the total assets 
                                                 
 282. Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and 
“Significant” Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 7731 (proposed Feb. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
 283. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat. 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323) 
(imposing only Federal Reserve supervision on nonbank financial companies after at 
least a two-thirds vote of the members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council). 
 284. Id. § 113(d), at 1401 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(d)). 
 285. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TOP 50 BHCS, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter TOP 50 BHCS]. 
 286. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP TRANSACTION REPORT (Mar. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing- 
room/reports/tarp-transactions/Pages/default.aspx (click on hyperlink dated 
March 24, 2011) [hereinafter TARP TRANSACTION REPORT]; PROPUBLICA, BAILOUT 
RECIPIENTS, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index (last visited Mar. 26, 
2011).  The eight firms from the top BHCs that did not accept any TARP funds 
include Taunus Corporation, HSBC North America Holdings Inc., TD Bank US 
Holding Company, Citizens Financial Group, Inc., UnionBanCal Corporation, 
BancWest Corporation, Harris Financial Corp., and BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc.  
TARP TRANSACTION REPORT, supra; TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285.  Ally Financial Inc., 
formerly known as GMAC Inc, accepted $16.29 billion in TARP funds under the 
Automotive Industry Financing Program, not the Capital Purchase Program. TARP 
TRANSACTION REPORT, supra; TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285; Press Release, Ally 
Financial Inc., Ally Financial Statement on New Corporate Brand (May 10, 2010), 
available at http://media.ally.com/index.php?s=43&item=401. 
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controlled by the smallest firm in the group.287  Bank of America 
Corporation has the largest amount with approximately $2.3 trillion 
worth of total assets, while Marshall & Ilsley Corporation has the 
smallest with only $50.2 billion worth of total assets.288 
The Hotel California provision seems to have been drafted with 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and American Express in mind.  All 
of those firms converted to BHCs during the financial crisis.289 
Goldman Sachs’s actions illustrate the concerns behind this 
provision.  Goldman Sachs avoided being subject to regulation by the 
Federal Reserve by owning an industrial loan company and a foreign 
bank, both of which are exempt from the definition of “bank” in the 
Bank Holding Company Act and thus, Goldman Sachs was not 
classified as a BHC subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve under 
that Act.290  Goldman Sachs only became a BHC in September 2008 
when financial firms were facing liquidity crises in the wake of 
Lehman’s collapse, and having greater access to the Federal Reserve’s 
lending facilities, particularly its discount window, was deemed highly 
desirable.291  In order to become a BHC, Goldman Sachs had to 
become an owner of a bank and it did so by merging its industrial 
loan company with Goldman Sachs Trust Company and converting 
the charter of the resulting firm into a New York state-chartered 
bank.292  In addition, as a BHC, Goldman Sachs received $10 billion 
in TARP funds, which also helped ease any financial problems that it 
was facing in the depths of the crisis.293  A little over a year later, 
                                                 
 287. See TOP 50 BHCS, supra note 285 (listing total assets of largest BHCs). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and American Express all became BHCs in 
order to access government assistance programs.  Eric Dash, American Express Becomes 
a Bank Holding Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-
amex.4.17725805.html; Schroeder, supra note 275. 
 290. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (2006); Goldman Sachs, Annual Report, (Form 10-
K), at Ex. 21.1 (2007), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-
firm/investors/financials/archived/10k/docs/2007-form-10-k-file.pdf; Goldman Sachs 
Gets its N.Y. Banking License, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29bizbriefs-
GOLDMAN_BRF.html?dbk. 
 291. Ben White, Starting a New Era at Goldman and Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23wall.html?scp=9&sq=Goldman+S
achs+to+become+bank+holding+company&st=nyt. 
 292. Goldman Sachs Gets its N.Y. Banking License, supra note 290. 
 293. Joe Nocera, Short Memories at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1, B5.  
Goldman also took advantage of other government programs to help out distressed 
financial firms, including the FDIC’s commercial paper guarantee program, the 
repayment of 100 cents on the dollar to all of AIG’s counterparties including 
Goldman Sachs, and the Term-Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility, which allowed 
participating financial firms to buy distressed securities and sell them at a profit.  Id. 
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
2011] THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS  1395 
Goldman Sachs was claiming that it had not needed the TARP funds 
and that it resented the strings that seemed to have come attached 
with taking that money in terms of the criticisms that it endured for 
setting aside $5.3 billion to pay out year-end bonuses in 2009.294  
These actions created the impression in some quarters that Goldman 
Sachs would reorganize itself to cease to be a BHC under the Federal 
Reserve’s supervision as soon as the economy recovered and it 
determined that it no longer needed the government’s assistance.295  
Section 117 would prevent this type of regulatory arbitrage by 
requiring Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, American Express and 
other similar large firms that took advantage of government 
assistance programs in troubled economic times by reorganizing 
themselves as BHCs to continue to be regulated by the Federal 
Reserve even if they cease to be bank holding companies at some 
point in the future.296   
4. Forcing certain nonbank financial companies to be supervised by the 
Federal Reserve 
As mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the FSOC the 
power to classify any entity that is not already a FHC, a BHC, or a 
THC subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve as a nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve.297  In order to 
classify a firm as a nonbank financial company supervised by the 
Federal Reserve, two-thirds of the voting members then serving on 
the FSOC must conclude that it warrants such supervision because 
the firm is a nonbank financial company and that its “material 
financial distress” or “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities” of the company “could 
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”298  To help 
the FSOC make this determination, the Dodd-Frank Act lists ten 
factors that they should consider as well as concluding that they may 
                                                 
 294. Id. 
 295. Courtney Comstock, Senator Corker Says He Made a Specific “Hotel California” 
Provision in Dodd’s New Bill for Goldman Sachs, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/corker-says-he-made-the-hotel-california-provision-
in-dodds-new-bill-for-goldman-sachs-2010-3; Steve Eder & Karey Wutkowski, Goldman 
Could Be a Bank, For Better or Worse, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/16/us-goldman-reform-analysis-
idUSTRE62F4TG20100316.  
 296. Dodd-Frank Act § 117, 124 Stat. 1406–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327). 
 297. Id. § 113, at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323). 
 298. Id. § 113(a)(1), at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323). 
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consider “any other risk-related factors” that they consider 
appropriate.299   
As previously noted, nonbank financial companies are defined as 
those whose gross revenues or total assets from financial activities 
equal or exceed 85% of their total gross revenues or total assets from 
all sources.300  The Act recognizes that such a bright line rule could 
lead to some firms attempting to avoid being classified as a nonbank 
financial company by keeping either their total gross revenues or 
total assets from financial activities under the 85% threshold.  The 
Act includes an antievasion provision which allows two-thirds of the 
voting members of the FSOC to agree to place a financial company 
under the supervision of the Federal Reserve even though that 
company has organized itself in such a way as to fall outside the 
definition of a nonbank financial company, provided that the 
“material financial distress” of the company poses a threat to the 
financial stability of the United States.301 
Berkshire Hathaway illustrates how a firm could change the mix of 
the businesses in which its subsidiaries operate in order to fall outside 
the definition of a nonbank financial company.  Berkshire Hathaway 
is not a BHC, a FHC, or a THC and so is not supervised by the 
Federal Reserve.302  In 2008 and 2009, more than 85% of its total 
revenues came from financial activities, predominately its insurance 
subsidiaries.303  In 2009, just under 85% of its total assets were 
associated with financial activities.304  Thus, if the Dodd-Frank Act had 
been in existence in 2008 and 2009, Berkshire Hathaway would have 
been classified as a nonbank financial company.305   
In 2010, Berkshire Hathaway acquired Burlington Northern Santa 
Fe Corporation, a railroad company.306  In the wake of that 
acquisition, only about 80% of Berkshire Hathaway’s total revenues 
came from financial activities and only roughly 69% of its total assets 
                                                 
 299. Id. § 113(a)(2), at 1398 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323). 
 300. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 301. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(c), 124 Stat. 1399 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §5323). 
 302. Berkshire Hathaway does not own any banks or thrifts and thus, is not 
required by law to be regulated by the Federal Reserve as a FHC, BHC, or THC.  See 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 10-K Report, supra note 20, at Ex. 21 (listing all of 
Berkshire Hathaway’s subsidiaries, which do not include any banks, thrifts, or 
industrial loan companies). 
 303. Id. at 28. 
 304. Id. at 61. 
 305. See Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5311) (defining nonbank financial companies as companies whose gross revenues or 
total assets from financial activities equal or exceed 85% of their total gross revenues 
or total assets from all sources). 
 306. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2010 10-K Report, supra note 20, at 36. 
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were associated with financial activities in 2010.307  Going forward, it is 
unlikely that Berkshire Hathaway’s total revenues from financial 
activities or total assets from financial activities will exceed the 85% 
threshold set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act.  If the antievasion 
provision did not exist, any firm that did not want to be classified as a 
nonbank financial company would simply acquire enough 
nonfinancial subsidiaries so that its total revenues from financial 
activities or total assets from financial activities fell below the 
thresholds set forth in the Act.308 
If the FSOC does place a firm under the supervision of the Federal 
Reserve, the Federal Reserve may only impose regulations on the 
firm’s financial activities and not on its nonfinancial activities.309  For 
example, if the FSOC decided that Berkshire Hathaway should be 
subject to Federal Reserve supervision, the Federal Reserve could 
only regulate the financial activities of Berkshire Hathaway and not its 
railroad subsidiaries. 
5. Weaknesses of the reforms aimed at reducing regulatory arbitrage 
a. Some current THCs might evade Federal Reserve supervision in the 
future   
The Hotel California provision only applies to companies that were 
classified as BHCs and FHCs on January 1, 2010.310  It would not apply 
to large THCs like AIG and Prudential Financial, two of the largest 
financial conglomerates in the United States.311  If any THC decided it 
no longer wanted to be supervised by the Federal Reserve, it could 
convert any thrift it owned to an industrial loan company and thereby 
cease to be a THC while still offering the same range of products and 
services.312  Depending upon which state the industrial loan company 
was chartered in, a THC that did this type of reorganization might 
still be subject to supervision by a state regulator as an industrial loan 
                                                 
 307. Id. at 28. 
 308. See, e.g., supra notes 302–307 and accompanying text (describing how 
Berkshire Hathaway has lowered its financial activities so as to fall outside the 
definition of a nonbank financial company). 
 309. Dodd-Frank Act, § 113(c)(6), 124 Stat. 1400–01 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5323). 
 310. Id. § 117, at 1406–07 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327). 
 311. Id. (Hotel California provision only applies to BHCs, not THCs). 
 312. While the Hotel California provision only applies to BHCs and not THCs, the 
Federal Reserve still will regulate THCs under the Dodd-Frank Act.  See id. §§ 117, 
301–19.  As a result, a THC would have to get rid of its thrift or convert it into an 
industrial loan company in order to escape being supervised by the Federal Reserve. 
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holding company, but it would no longer be subject to supervision by 
any federal holding company regulator.313 
Alternatively, a THC could sell its thrifts, which would also result in 
it ceasing to be a THC, but it probably would no longer be able to 
offer the full range of services that it had previously provided unless it 
either owned or acquired a foreign bank, as holding companies for 
foreign banks are not classified as BHCs or FHCs subject to 
supervision by the Federal Reserve.314  If it acquired a foreign bank, it 
would no longer be subject to supervision by any state or federal 
holding company regulator.  It might, however, become subject to 
similar supervision by the relevant foreign financial services regulator 
in the country that chartered the foreign bank that it acquired.315  For 
example, if the company acquired a French bank, the EU Financial 
Conglomerate Directive would require it to be supervised on a 
consolidated basis by the French financial supervisor because it has 
no U.S. financial supervisor fulfilling that function.316  
The Federal Reserve would have to convince the FSOC to classify 
any THC that undertook such reorganizations as a nonbank financial 
company subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.  In cases like 
AIG, getting two-thirds of the FSOC voting members to agree to do 
this probably would not be difficult because the federal government 
had to provide $125 billion to AIG in order to bail it out during the 
financial crisis.317  The Federal Reserve probably would find it 
significantly more difficult to persuade two-thirds of the FSOC voting 
members that companies like Prudential Financial, which did not 
receive any TARP funds, constitute a threat to the financial stability of 
the United States.318 
b. The FSOC might find it difficult to agree on which firms pose a 
threat to financial stability 
Getting two-thirds of the voting members of the FSOC to agree to 
require a firm to submit to Federal Reserve supervision may prove 
                                                 
 313. See supra Part I.E (describing how state banking and financial institution 
regulators also regulate holding companies). 
 314. Foreign banks are excluded from the definition of bank under the Bank 
Holding Company Act.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(A) (2006).  
 315. Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 72, at Ch. II, Art. 18. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Jim Puzzanghera, AIG Makes $6.9-billion Repayment of TARP Bailout Funds, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/09/business/la-fi-aig-
tarp-20110309. 
 318. Prudential, Ameriprise Turn Down TARP, UPI.COM, May 16, 2009, 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2009/05/16/Prudential-Ameriprise-turn-
down-TARP/UPI-80481242481550/. 
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problematic.  The FSOC is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and is 
comprised of nine other voting members who are the Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Director of the FDIC, the SEC Chairman, the CFTC 
Chairman, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), the Director of the FHFA, the Chairman of the 
NCUA, and an insurance expert appointed by the president.319  The 
FSOC also has five nonvoting members, including the Director of the 
Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”), the Director of Office of Financial 
Research, and three representatives from the state financial 
regulators with one of these representing each of the major sectors-
banking, securities, and insurance.320   
The members of the FSOC do not have a strong history of working 
together.  This is due in part to the fact that each of these agencies 
has different regulatory objectives and constituencies.321  Some of 
these agencies have engaged in bitter turf wars in the past over who 
had the right to regulate a particular product or firm.322  It is doubtful 
that they will work smoothly together on the FSOC. 
The experience of FFIEC illustrates this.  FFIEC only has five 
members, but how well those members cooperated with one another 
has been highly dependent on the individuals representing each 
agency at any given time.323  As a result, it suffered from cooperation 
and coordination problems at various times in its history.   
These types of problems are likely to be worse with the FSOC, 
which has twice as many voting members as FFIEC.324  Various studies 
on boards of directors have found that as the number of board 
                                                 
 319. Dodd-Frank Act, § 111(b), 124 Stat. 1392 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). 
 320. Id. § 111(b)(2), at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). 
 321. See supra Part I (describing the varying objectives of the different 
organizations before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 322. FCIC REPORT, supra note 116, at 46–48, 152 (describing disputes between the 
CFTC and the SEC and between the SEC and the OTS); Brown, supra note 6, at 52–
57, 64–65 (discussing agency turf wars between federal and state bank regulators and 
between the SEC and CFTC). 
 323. OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 154, at 14–15 (discussing problems among the 
banking regulators with creating uniform examination procedures and reports); id. 
at 16–18 (discussing problems with expanding the number of agencies on FFIEC and 
problems concerning coordination efforts between the banking agencies and the 
SEC); GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 147, at 97–101.  
 324. Compare Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b), supra notes 319–320 and accompanying 
text (listing the ten voting members of the FSOC and the five nonvoting members of 
the FSOC), with OIG FFIEC REPORT, supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting 
there were five members of the FFIEC). 
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members increase, the coordination and cooperation problems 
worsen.325 
c. The Federal Reserve may prove to be a poor supervisor  
While all of these actions eliminate regulatory arbitrage, that alone 
is not sufficient to prevent a future financial crisis.  Much will depend 
on how well the Federal Reserve fulfills it roles as the primary 
regulator of financial conglomerates.  The jury is still out on whether 
the Federal Reserve proved to be a substantially better supervisor of 
financial institutions than the other regulators. 
Before the crisis, the Federal Reserve was responsible for regulating 
both very large financial conglomerates and very small state chartered 
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve.326  In 2006, before 
the financial crisis began, the Federal Reserve supervised 901 state-
chartered member banks with average assets of $1.5 billion, 4,654 
small BHCs with average assets of $203 million, and 448 large BHCs 
with average assets of $27 billion, as well as 643 FHCs.327  These 6,646 
institutions in 2006 represented a 5% decline from the 7,046 
institutions, including 1,042 state-chartered member banks and 6,004 
BHCs, supervised by the Federal Reserve a decade earlier in 1995.328  
The number of full-time employees of the Federal Reserve, however, 
                                                 
 325. Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren & Martin T. Wells, Larger Board Size 
and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 53 (1998) (finding that 
larger boards in small firms led to lower firm performance due in part to problems 
with communication and coordination); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuations of 
Companies With a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 185–86 (1996) (finding 
that the stock markets reward companies with small boards of directors with higher 
stock valuation); Martin A. Lipton & Jay W. Losch, A Modest Proposal for Improved 
Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAWYER 59, 70–72 (1992) (noting that boards with more 
than ten members are slower to make decisions, and have less candid discussions).  
But see Mohamed Belkhin, Board of Directors’ Size and Performance in the Banking 
Industry, 5 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 201 (2009) (finding no negative relationship 
associated with size of board and the firm’s performance);  Kenneth M. Lehn, 
Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Determinates of the Size and Composition of US Corporate 
Boards:  1935–2000, 38 FIN. MANAGEMENT 747, 748 (Winter 2009) (finding “no robust 
relationship” between board size and firm performance); Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. 
Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Boards:  Does One Size Fit All, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 351 (2008) 
(concluding that certain types of firms benefit from larger boards).  
 326. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 93D ANNUAL REPORT 65 
(2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual06/pdf/ar06.pdf; 
U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:  
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 60 (9th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (shares regulatory authority 
with the FDIC for state chartered member banks). 
 327. FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 65. 
 328. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 82D ANNUAL REPORT 231 
(1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 1995], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ann95.pdf. 
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declined 17% from a total of 22,457 full-time employees in 1995 to 
18,681 full-time employees in 2006.329  Thus, the Federal Reserve’s 
resources to supervise financial firms shrank substantially more than 
the number of firms it oversaw during the ten year period prior to 
the financial crisis. 
TARP and other actions have to some extent masked how many 
financial conglomerates regulated by the Federal Reserve might have 
failed because of poor supervision.  The same is not true at the other 
end of the scale.  Smaller firms were not so lucky and hundreds of 
them were allowed to fail.330  The number of U.S. banks and thrifts 
that have failed in this recent crisis is considerably smaller then the 
number that failed during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and 
1990s, as illustrated in Figure 4.  Nevertheless, the amount of assets 
controlled by the U.S. banks and thrifts that failed in 2008 was 
greater than the amount of assets controlled by the U.S. banks and 
thrifts that failed in any single year during the savings and loan crisis, 
as also shown in Figure 4. 
  
                                                 
 329. Id. at 293; FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 297. 
 330. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS INTERACTIVE 
DATABASE, SUMMARY REPORT OF YEARS 1970 TO 2010, available at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30  (select “Effective Date” 
range from “1970 to 2010” and “Report” type as “Summary”). 
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Figure 4:  Total Number of Failed U.S. Banks and Thrifts and Their Total 
Assets:  1980–2010 (total assets in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars)331 
 
 
 
With regard to these smaller institutions, the Federal Reserve 
performed no better than the FDIC or the OCC when comparing the 
number of banks under its supervision that failed or required 
assistance from the FDIC with the total number of institutions under 
its supervision, as illustrated in Figure 5.  Only the OTS had a worse 
track record.   
  
                                                 
 331. Id.; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS AT A GLANCE, FDIC HISTORICAL 
TRENDS—AS OF DEC. 31, 2010, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/index.html (under December 2010 
Statistics, select “FDIC Historical Trends”); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI 
INFLATION CALCULATOR, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (to convert 
asset values into constant 2009 U.S. dollars). 
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Figure 5:  Number of Failed and Assisted Institutions by Regulator as a 
Percentage of the Total Number of Institutions Supervised by That Regulator 
in 2006332 
 
B. Improved Supervision of Holding Companies 
The Dodd-Frank Act did not just attempt to reduce regulatory 
arbitrage by FHCs.  It also took two actions to enhance supervision of 
such companies.   
1. The Act established uniform minimum capital adequacy standards 
The Dodd-Frank Act established one set of minimum capital 
requirements for insured depository institutions, BHCs, and nonbank 
financial companies subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.333  
                                                 
 332. Assisted institutions does not refer to troubled financial institutions that 
received TARP funds, but instead to institutions that were either acquired by another 
institution with the assistance of the FDIC or were involved in open bank assistance 
transactions in which the FDIC provided the troubled institution with funds to keep 
it from failing.  For a definition of “open bank assistance,” see FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 47 (2003), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html (select Chapter 5).  
For data in Figure 5, see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE 
TRANSACTIONS INTERACTIVE DATABASE, DETAILED SEARCH OF YEARS 2006 TO 2010, 
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (select “Effective 
Date” range from “2006 to 2010”, select “Report” type as “Detailed”, selected Charter 
Type as “All Commercial & Savings”, and select Transaction Type as “All Transaction 
Types”); FEDERAL RESERVE ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 326, at 65, 127; OFFICE OF 
THRIFT SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2006 FACT BOOK 5 (2006), available 
at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/2006FactBook.pdf.  For purposes of this chart, the 
FDIC-supervised institutions includes both failed and assisted banks and savings 
banks as a percentage of all of the financial institutions supervised by the FDIC in 
2006. 
 333. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 171(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010) 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). 
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The minimum capital requirements include both generally 
applicable minimum leverage capital requirements334 and the 
generally applicable risk-based capital requirements.335  The Dodd-
Frank Act states that the levels for these two requirements on July 21, 
2010 serve as a floor and prohibits the Federal Reserve from reducing 
these requirements below their levels on July 21, 2010.336  The Act 
allows the Federal Reserve to set higher amounts for both generally 
applicable minimum leverage capital requirements and the generally 
applicable risk-based capital requirements than the levels that they 
were at on July 21, 2010.  
The advantage of this requirement is that all holding companies 
for financial services that are systemically important will be required 
to meet the same, minimum capital adequacy requirements.  As a 
result, these holding companies will be on a level playing field in 
terms of competition.  As noted above, under the prior regulatory 
regime, CSEs had a competitive advantage over FHCs and BHCs 
because of the weaker capital requirements imposed on them by the 
SEC than the requirements imposed on FHCs and BHCs by the 
Federal Reserve.337  In addition, if the Federal Reserve becomes 
captured by the financial conglomerates that it supervises, this 
measure will prevent those conglomerates from using their influence 
over the Federal Reserve to undermine capital adequacy standards 
completely because the Federal Reserve does not have complete 
discretion on the required levels due to this provision in the Act.338 
Another effect of this provision is that the largest banks in the 
United States will probably not be allowed to use their own internal 
risk models that would allow them to operate with lower minimum 
risk-based capital requirements than smaller banks.339  The Federal 
                                                 
 334. These are defined as “the minimum ratios of tier 1 capital to average total 
assets” set by the federal banking regulators.  Id. § 171(a)(1), at 1435 (to be codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). 
 335.  These are defined as the ratios based on “the regulatory capital components 
in the numerator” and “the risk-weighted assets in the denominator.” Id.  
§ 171(a)(2)(B), at 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). 
 336. Id. § 171(b), at 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).  The Dodd-Frank 
Act also contains some phase-in periods for certain debt and equity instruments and 
for depository institution holding companies that were not regulated by the Federal 
Reserve on May 19, 2010.  Id. § 171(b)(4), at 1437 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5371).   
 337. SEC IG’S CSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4, 19–20. 
 338. § 171(b), 124 Stat. 1436 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371). 
 339. The FDIC, OCC, and the Federal Reserve issued on Dec. 16, 2010 a joint 
notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the advanced risk-based capital adequacy 
standards under Basle II that they had approved in 2007 to eliminate the transitional 
floors that would have allowed certain banks to use internal risk models to lower 
their capital adequacy requirements.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-88-2010, PROPOSED 
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Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC currently are considering adopting a 
rule to that effect.340  If such a rule is ultimately adopted, it will also 
allow small banks to compete with larger banks on a more level 
playing field in the future.  As a result, banks and other financial 
institutions may not feel pressured as much to merge as they would 
have if the advanced risk-based capital adequacy standards that the 
federal banking regulators originally adopted under Basel II were left 
in place.  Without this pressure, fewer financial institutions may join 
the ranks of the “too big to fail” firms because they no longer think 
that they must in order to remain competitive. 
2. The Act gives the Federal Reserve greater powers to examine a holding 
company’s subsidiaries 
The ability of a holding company regulator to examine the 
subsidiaries of a financial conglomerate remains a pressing concern 
because the Dodd-Frank Act did not simplify the regulatory structure 
within the United States.  The U.S. regulatory structure continues to 
rely heavily on functional and institutional regulation as illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
  
                                                 
RULE ON ADVANCED CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK—BASEL II; ESTABLISHMENT OF A RISK-
BASED CAPITAL FLOOR  (2010).  The notice and comment period has expired.  See id. 
(noting that comments were due sixty days after its publication on December 16, 
2010).  
 340. Id. 
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Figure 6:  How the Dodd-Frank Act Changed the Regulation of Financial 
Conglomerates341 
 
  
                                                 
 341. Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5321); id. § 1011, at 1964–65 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). 
F inancial
Holding
Company
National
Bank
State
Member
Bank
State
Non‐Member
Bank
Federal 
Savings &
Loan
Insurance 
Company
Financial Services Firm Relevant Federal and State 
Regulators
Federal Reserve
OCC
Treasury
Investment
Bank
FDIC
SEC
CFTC
State
Banking
Regulators
State
Insurance
Regulators
State
Securities
Regulators
State Savings 
& Loan
State Thrift
Regulators
SIPC
Financial 
Stability 
Oversight 
Council
Treasury
CFPB
NCUA
FHFA
Insurance 
expert
FIO
Office of 
Fin. 
Research
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
2011] THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS  1407 
The number of regulators operating with the United States 
remains largely unchanged in the wake of the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  While the OTS will be gone by 2012 at the latest, 
the Act created a new federal regulator in the form of the CFPB.342  
The CFPB has the authority to regulate any consumer financial 
product or service, except for products and services that fall within 
the business of insurance or are considered electronic conduit 
services, which the Act broadly defines to cover any type of electronic 
data transmission, telecommunication system, or electronic 
network.343  As a result, all of the subsidiaries of the financial 
conglomerate depicted in Figure 6, with the possible exception of the 
insurance company, may be required to comply with regulations 
issued by the CFPB.344 
The Dodd-Frank Act did improve the ability of the Federal Reserve 
to examine at least some of the subsidiaries of the holding companies 
under its supervision by requiring it to investigate nonbank 
subsidiaries that are engaged in activities that the subsidiary bank can 
perform.345  An example of this would be a mortgage broker that is a 
subsidiary of a BHC.  It is engaged in mortgage lending but does not 
take deposits.  Thus, the mortgage broker qualifies as a nonbank 
subsidiary.  It is, however, competing with banks that also issue 
mortgages.  Thus, the Federal Reserve would be required to examine 
the mortgage brokerage subsidiary of the BHC under the Dodd-
Frank Act.   
3. The FSOC provides an inter-agency forum for making additional 
improvements to supervision 
The Dodd-Frank Act envisions that the FSOC will not only provide 
a forum for inter-agency information sharing and coordination of 
regulatory activities, but that it would fulfill several new supervisory 
and regulatory functions as well.346  These duties include, among 
others, directing the work of the Office of Financial Research, 
monitoring the financial system to identify threats to its stability, 
advising Congress on domestic and international financial services 
                                                 
 342. See id. § 1011, at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (establishing the 
CFPB). 
 343. Id. §§ 1002, 1011, at 1956, 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481 and  
12 U.S.C. § 5491, respectively). 
 344. See id. § 1011, at 1964 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (explaining that 
the CFPB will regulate consumer financial products and services under the federal 
consumer financial laws). 
 345. Id. § 605(b), at 1604 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831c).   
 346. Id. § 112(a)(2), at 1395–96 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5322). 
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regulatory proposals, making recommendations to its member 
agencies regarding supervisory priorities, reviewing and commenting 
to the SEC on accounting principles and practices, and making 
recommendations to the Federal Reserve regarding prudential 
standards and risk management.347  The FSOC can also compel its 
member agencies, the Office of Financial Research and the FIO, to 
provide it with any information or data that it deems necessary to 
fulfill its duties under the Act.348  It can also compel certain financial 
firms to provide it with information that it deems necessary to 
safeguard the stability of the financial system.349 
4. Weaknesses of the reforms to improve supervision 
a. The FSOC’s powers to examine other types of nonbank subsidiaries 
continue to be limited  
The Dodd-Frank Act does not require the Federal Reserve to 
examine nonbank subsidiaries that are not engaged in activities that a 
subsidiary bank can perform.350  The Federal Reserve still retains its 
limited power to do so as the Dodd-Frank Act did not eliminate the 
authority granted to the Federal Reserve to examine a subsidiary if it 
determined that the subsidiary posed a material risk to an affiliated 
depository institution, if it determined such an examination is 
necessary to obtain information on any financial and operational 
risks that pose a material risk to any depository subsidiary, or if it has 
reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in compliance with 
any law that it has the jurisdiction to enforce.351  In addition, the 
Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that, in the case of functionally 
regulated subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve should not ask for new 
reports, but it should rely on the reports already prepared by the 
subsidiary for its functional regulator “to the fullest extent 
possible.”352  As a result, it is still unlikely that under the Dodd-Frank 
Act examination procedures the Federal Reserve will uncover the 
risks posed by any holding company nonbank subsidiary like those of 
AIG Financial Products Corporation, which was a nonbank subsidiary 
that was not engaged in banking activities. 
                                                 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. § 112(a)(2)(A), (D), at 1395, 1396–97 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5322).   
 349. Id. 
 350. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
 351. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
 352. Dodd-Frank Act § 604, 124 Stat. 1600 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1844(c)(1)). 
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b. The FSOC generally cannot compel the Federal Reserve or the FSOC 
members to adopt any of the new regulations that it recommends 
With the exception of requiring the Federal Reserve to supervise 
particular nonbank financial companies, directing the work of the 
Office of Financial Research, and compelling certain institutions to 
provide it with information, the FSOC has no authority to compel 
either its member agencies or any financial firm to take any particular 
regulatory action.  As a result, its direct regulatory powers are rather 
weak.  
C. Attempts to Address the “Too Big To Fail” Problem 
The Dodd-Frank Act makes a few attempts to provide mechanisms 
for regulators to use to deal with the “too big to fail” problem.  
Unfortunately, these actions are inadequate to the task.353  
1. Limits placed on growth of financial conglomerates 
The Act attempts to strengthen the restrictions on financial 
conglomerates from becoming too big to fail by imposing some limits 
on their growth.  It does this in two ways.  One way is by eliminating 
the loophole in the Riegle-Neal Act that permitted mergers between 
banks and thrifts or industrial loan companies that would create an 
entity that controlled more than 10% of the deposits in the United 
States.354  It does this by prohibiting interstate mergers that create any 
depository institution, not just a bank, that controls more than 10% 
of the deposits in the United States.355   
Another way that the Act places restrictions on financial 
companies’ growth is by not permitting “financial companies,” which 
include more than just depository institutions, from merging if the 
resulting company would control more than 10% of the total 
consolidated liabilities of all financial companies at the end of the 
prior year.356   
                                                 
 353. For a more detailed analysis of this particular issue, see Arthur E. Wilmarth 
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act:  A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 
89 OREGON L. R. (forthcoming 2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719126. 
 354. Dodd-Frank Act § 623(a), 124 Stat. 1634 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
1828(c)). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. § 622, at 1632 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
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2. Allows the FSOC to make recommendations to address problems caused by 
the size and complexity of financial conglomerates  
The Dodd-Frank Act allows the FSOC to make recommendations 
to the Federal Reserve regarding what standards to use to address the 
problems posed by the growth in size and complexity of firms.357  This 
potentially provides another force on the Federal Reserve, 
encouraging it to adopt stronger prudential regulations to balance 
the pressure from the financial services industry for weaker 
regulations.   
3. Attempts to establish an orderly liquidation process for financial 
conglomerates 
The Dodd-Frank Act creates what it calls an “orderly liquidation 
authority” to force a troubled firm into liquidation to avoid a 
bailout.358  Under this authority, the Treasury, the FDIC, and the 
Federal Reserve have the power to force a firm into liquidation, but 
only if they unanimously agree to do so.359  In addition, it requires 
that at least two-thirds of the directors on the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve and at least two-thirds of the directors on the 
Board of Directors for the FDIC have to approve the liquidation.360   
4. Bans the use of taxpayer funds to bail out troubled financial firms 
Finally, as part of this orderly liquidation authority, the Dodd-Frank 
Act attempts to create a mechanism to liquidate financial firms while 
having the costs of liquidation borne by the liquidating firm, its 
shareholders and creditors, and paid for by an assessment on large 
financial companies like an insurance guarantee fund.361  The Act 
goes so far as to expressly ban taxpayer funds from being used to 
bailout or prevent the liquidation of any firm.362   
                                                 
 357. Id. § 112(a)(2)(I), at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322). 
 358. Id. §§ 201–17, at 1377–524 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–401). 
 359. Id. § 206, at 1459 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386). 
 360. Id. § 203(a)(1)(A), at 1450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383). 
 361. Id. § 214, at 1518 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394). 
 362. Id. § 214(c), at 1518 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394). 
BROWN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  6:48 PM 
2011] THE NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS  1411 
5. Weaknesses of the reforms aimed at addressing the “too big to fail” 
problem 
a. Loopholes continue to exist that will allow firms to evade the caps on 
their growth  
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act leaves open two loopholes, 
which could result in other financial conglomerates controlling more 
than 10% of the total deposits in the United States.  The Act expressly 
allows mergers that would create an entity that controls more than 
10% of the total deposits in the United States when the merger 
involves at least one financially distressed firm.363  The merger 
between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch was just such a merger 
and resulted in a firm that now controls more than 11% of the 
deposits in the United States.364  In addition, the Act’s limits only 
apply to interstate mergers.365  Thus, the Act would allow intrastate 
mergers that would create a firm with more than 10% of the deposits 
in the United States. 
With regard to the prohibition on a merger that would result in a 
firm possessing 10% of the total consolidated liabilities of all financial 
companies at the end of the prior year, the Dodd-Frank Act provides 
three ways that this limit can be circumvented.  The first way is if the 
merger involves at least one firm that is in default or on the verge of 
default.366  The second way is if it is part of one of FDIC’s assistance 
programs.367  The third way is if the amount of the increase in total 
liabilities above the limit is a “de minimis” amount above the limit.368  
The Act, however, does not define what would be a “de minimis” 
amount.369  These exceptions would allow two already too big to fail 
firms, like Bank of America and Merrill Lynch or JP Morgan Chase 
and Bear Stearns, to merge and control more than 10% of the total 
liabilities of all financial companies.  In other words, the exceptions 
undermine the very purpose of the new rule. 
                                                 
 363. Id. § 622(b), (c)(1), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
 364. Federal Reserve System, Bank of America Corporation, Charlotte, NC, Order 
Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial Loan Company 
2 (Nov. 26, 2008).  Bank of America controlled 10.8% of the deposits in the United 
States and Merrill Lynch controlled 1.1% of the deposits in the United States at the 
time that the Federal Reserve approved their merger.  Id.  The combined firm 
controlled 11.9% of the deposits in the United States.  Id. 
 365. Dodd-Frank Act § 622(b), 124 Stat. 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
 366. Id. § 622(c)(1), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
 367. Id. § 622(c)(2), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
 368. Id. § 622(c)(3), at 1633 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). 
 369. Id.  
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b. The FSOC has no authority to force the Federal Reserve to actually 
adopt new regulations or standards 
As discussed above, FSOC can only make recommendations to the 
Federal Reserve.  The Federal Reserve is not required to implement 
these recommendations.370  Given how much the Federal Reserve 
craves its independence, it is unclear whether it would be receptive to 
the recommendations by the FSOC. 
c. The agreement among the relevant agencies that a firm needs to be 
liquidated may be difficult to achieve   
The decision to force a firm into liquidation must be a unanimous 
decision by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.371  Just 
getting all three agencies to agree probably will be difficult, 
particularly if the personalities heading those agencies do not get 
along.372  The Dodd-Frank Act makes reaching such an agreement 
even more difficult by requiring that two-thirds of the Board of 
Directors of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC must approve the 
liquidation.373 
The United Kingdom’s experience during the Northern Rock crisis 
illustrates this point.  A memorandum of understanding had 
established a Tripartite Arrangement under which the Bank of 
England, the Treasury, and the Financial Services Authority could 
intervene to provide emergency assistance to a financial institution, 
but only if all three agreed that such intervention was necessary.374  In 
the case of Northern Rock, the Bank of England was reluctant to 
provide assistance because of concerns about creating a moral hazard 
problem.375  The delays caused by the Bank of England’s 
                                                 
 370. See supra Part III.B.4.b. 
 371. See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
 372. During the financial crisis, it was well known that Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair did not get along well with each other and 
as a result, found it difficult to work together on issues that required their 
cooperation. 
 373. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5383). 
 374. HM TREASURY ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HM 
TREASURY, THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 1, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/mou.pdf. 
 375. Ian McConnell, About-turn from Bank Causes Stock Market Rocketing, HERALD 
SCOTLAND, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.heraldscotland.com/about-turn-from-bank-of-
england-sends-stock-market-rocketing-1.865568.  
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unwillingness to authorize an intervention led to the first run on a 
British bank in over 100 years.376 
d. Troubled financial firms can still receive other forms of government 
assistance, even if they cannot directly receive taxpayer funds   
Unfortunately, the prohibition on using taxpayer funds is not air 
tight.  The reality is that the Act allows the FDIC to provide assistance 
to the liquidating firm’s receiver in order to facilitate an orderly 
liquidation.377  The FDIC can do this by providing loans, purchasing 
or guaranteeing against loss of the firm’s assets, assuming or 
guaranteeing obligations of the firm, taking a lien on the firm’s 
assets, or providing the funding for a bridge financial company.378   
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act only expressly prohibits the use of 
taxpayer funds, but it does not prohibit the use of other funds to bail 
out troubled firms.379  For example, troubled firms could continue to 
use the Federal Reserve’s discount window and other programs prior 
to entering receivership. 
CONCLUSIONS:  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
We are better off than we were before, but the Dodd-Frank Act still 
falls short in a number of areas.  It is doubtful that Congress will have 
the political will to revisit any of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in the near future.  Hopefully, Congress will not wait for another 
major financial crisis before doing so.  The areas where 
improvements could be made the next time these issues are 
addressed include, among others, completely eliminating the 
possibility of regulatory arbitrage for financial conglomerates, closing 
or narrowing the loopholes that allow financial conglomerates to 
grow beyond the caps set forth in the statutes, and simplifying the 
regulatory structure to move it towards a twin peaks model.   
With regard to the first issue, the Dodd-Frank Act sets up a rather 
elaborate scheme to preserve some of the authority of existing state 
agencies to regulate financial conglomerates, while moving towards 
having the Federal Reserve supervise all of the largest, most 
systemically important financial conglomerates.  This arrangement is 
                                                 
 376. Rosa M. Lastra, Northern Rock and Banking Law Reform in the UK, in THE 
FAILURE OF NORTHERN ROCK:  A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE STUDY 133–34 (Tim 
Congdon et. al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study20091.pdf. 
 377. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(d), 124 Stat. 1455 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Wilmarth, supra note 353, at 50–54. 
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complex and cumbersome, and these characteristics may undermine 
its effectiveness.  If two-thirds of the voting members of the FSOC 
cannot agree that a nonbank financial company should be supervised 
by the Federal Reserve, then it will escape such supervision.  Thus, 
nonbank financial companies that want to escape such regulation 
would only have to convince four members on the FSOC to block any 
move to make them subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.  
Since agency capture is a documented problem, the ability of 
industry groups to prevent the Federal Reserve from regulation of 
systemically important holding companies is very real.  An easier 
method of eliminating the problems of regulatory arbitrage would 
have been to make the Federal Reserve responsible for supervising all 
holding companies for financial services firms, regardless of whether 
they are BHCs, FHCs, or nonbank holding companies.  
In terms of making additional progress on the too big to fail 
problem, the easiest fix would be to close or narrow the loopholes 
that allow firms to grow beyond the caps set forth in the statutes.  
Certainly, the intrastate loophole should be eliminated.  In addition, 
Congress may also want to reconsider whether firms that have already 
exceeded these caps should be broken up or at least forced to spin 
off sufficient assets to bring them under the caps. 
Finally, the U.S. regulatory system needs to be simplified and 
moved away from a functional regulatory structure towards one that 
regulates based on the risks posed by the products, services, or firms.  
The complexity and costs of the current structure encouraged firms 
to seek ways to avoid it.  These incentives have only been heightened 
with the new, more complex structure created by the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
In addition, the structure’s very complexity was part of the reason 
that firms were able to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the first 
place.  The structure is based on rigid definitions for banking, 
securities, and insurance products that allowed them to create hybrid 
products, services, or firms that failed to fit within those definitions.  
By minding the gaps in the U.S. regulatory structure, financial firms 
were able to take on excessive risks and create and sell questionable 
products and services. 
Other countries, like Australia, that have moved to a twin peaks 
model avoid most of the problems that the United States experienced 
in the recent financial crisis.  For example, unlike the United States, 
Australia did not have to bail out a single one of its financial 
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institutions nor did it have dozens of financial firms fail.380  In a twin 
peaks model, there is one national regulator for prudential risks and 
one national regulator for market conduct and consumer protection 
risks.381  The Dodd-Frank Act moved the United States slightly in that 
direction by creating the CFPB and by giving the Federal Reserve 
most of the authority to prudentially regulate systemically important 
financial conglomerates.  President Obama and his team did not feel 
that the political will existed to move to a twin peaks model, despite 
the fact that the Treasury Secretary for his Republican predecessor 
had proposed doing just that in his blueprint for financial regulatory 
reform.  At some point in the future, the United States is going to 
have to address this issue because the fragmentary nature of our 
regulatory structure was the underlying cause for the problems with 
the way the United States supervised financial conglomerates.  The 
fragmentary structure allowed regulatory arbitrage, created the need 
for and the absence of regulatory coordination among agencies, 
encouraged the lack of uniform supervisory and regulatory standards, 
contributed to the lack of understanding by holding company 
regulators of the risks posed by the subsidiaries within those 
companies, and ultimately fostered our inability to adequately 
address the too big to fail problem.  Reforming the U.S. regulatory 
structure is the one of the most important projects left undone by the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
                                                 
 380. Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILL. L. REV. 509, 525 (2010). 
 381. Id. at 514–15. 
